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“Standing” Up for the Environment: The Ability of 
Plaintiffs To Establish Legal Standing To Redress 
Injuries Caused by Global Warming 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Corpses floating in the streets;1 citizens looting the city they had 
once called home;2 people wading through inundated 
neighborhoods, foraging “for the bare necessities of life.”3 Such grim 
scenes one might expect to view on the nightly news—another 
unfortunate account, perhaps, of the misery and disorder plaguing a 
third-world country. Few hearts were prepared, however, to observe 
these deplorable scenes occurring in their own country. 
The source of this unprecedented disaster was Hurricane Katrina, 
and it delivered to Gulf Coast residents an indelible lesson of why 
many refer to such a hurricane as nothing less than a “monster.”4 
Katrina’s pulverizing winds and towering storm surge toppled the 
concrete floodwalls protecting the city of New Orleans, releasing “a 
 1. Hearing on Experiences and Challenges of Hurricane Katrina Evacuees Before the H. 
Select Comm. on Katrina Response Investigation, 109th Cong. (2005) (statement of Ishmael 
Muhammad), available at LEXIS, News Library; see also Rob Puentes Discusses the Poor and 
Stranded in America (NPR radio broadcast Jan. 11, 2006) (transcript on file with LEXIS, 
News Library).  
 2. Gallup Poll on Police Shows Why More Citizens Are Buying Guns, Says CCRKBA, 
U.S. NEWSWIRE, Nov. 10, 2005, available at http://releases.usnewswire.com/ 
printing.asp?id=56575; see also Tim Padgett, Can New Orleans Do Better? After His Katrina 
Performance, Mayor Ray Nagin Needs to Show He’s the One To Revive the City, TIME, Oct. 24, 
2005, at 34. 
 3. David Ovalle et al., Region Awash in Heartbreak and Heroism, SEATTLE TIMES, 
Aug. 31, 2005, at A1. 
 4. Tom Vanden Brook & Larry Copeland, Hurricane Katrina: 160 MPH “Monster”—
New Orleans Residents Ordered Out as Storm Screams Towards Land, USA TODAY, Aug. 29, 
2005, available at http://www.keepmedia.com/pubs/USATODAY/2005/08/29/983049. 
“The word ‘hurricane’ is derived from Hurican, the god of evil of the Carib people of the 
Caribbean. Hurican was himself inspired by the Mayan god Hurakan, who destroyed humans 
with great storms and floods.” Brian Handwerk, Eye on the Storm: Hurricane Katrina Fast 
Facts, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC NEWS, Sept. 6, 2005, available at 
http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2005/09/0906_050906_katrina_facts.html.  
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wall of water” that devastated the city and created “the costliest 
storm in U.S. history.”5
In addition to its astronomical costs, Katrina ignited a storm of 
speculation over the possible link between global warming and the 
cause of the storm. Robert F. Kennedy Jr. blamed Katrina partly on 
“President Bush’s reluctance to cap carbon-dioxide emissions.”6 
Former Vice President Al Gore, speaking of lessons learned from 
Katrina, stated that although terrorism is “extremely serious . . . on a 
long-term global basis, global warming is the most serious problem 
we’re facing.”7
Not everyone agrees, however, that there is a causal link between 
global warming and natural disasters such as Katrina. According to 
President George W. Bush, Katrina was not the consequence of “the 
malice of evil men,” but rather “the fury of water and wind.”8 Dr. 
William Gray, a pioneer in the science of hurricane forecasting, is 
confident that Katrina was not caused by global warming and that 
the impact of global warming on hurricanes is being “grossly 
exaggerated.”9 The EPA admits that it is still uncertain about the 
actual character of the risks associated with global warming.10
 5. Joby Warrick & Michael Grunwald, Investigators Link Levee Failures to Design Flaws, 
WASH. POST, Oct. 24, 2005, at A1. Daniel Genter, a Louisiana native and president of RNC 
Genter Capital, remarked that New Orleans “looks like a Third World country that has been 
artillery shelled.” Tom Sullivan, Future of New Orleans Debt Remains Uncertain, WALL ST. J., 
Jan. 13, 2006, at C3. 
 6. Patrick J. Michaels, The Global-Warming God: Must It Now Be Appeased?, NAT’L 
REV., Oct. 10, 2005, available at http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/ 
michaels200510050829.asp.
 7. The “Oh, Really” Factor, INVESTOR’S BUS. DAILY, Nov. 15, 2005, at A16. 
 8. William Yardley & Michael Luo, As Recovery Slowly Starts, Some Lights Go On and 
Some Mail Is Delivered, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2005, at 26.
 9. James K. Glassman, Hurricanes and Global Warming: Interview with Meteorologist 
Dr. William Gray, CAPITALISM MAG., Sept. 12, 2005, available at 
http://capmag.com/article.asp?ID=4403. Dr. Gray “has worked in the observational and 
theoretical aspects of tropical meteorological research for more than 40 years” and his 
“hurricane forecast[s] [have] gained international attention, and won him the Neil Frank 
Award of the National Hurricane Conference in 1995.” The Online Resource for the Tropical 
Storm Forecaster, The Tropical Meteorology Project, http://tropical.atmos.colostate.edu (last 
visited Mar. 1, 2006).
 10. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, GLOBAL WARMING, CLIMATE, UNCERTAINTIES, 
http://yosemite.epa.gov/oar/globalwarming.nsf/content/climateuncertainties.html (last 
visited Mar. 1, 2006). In upholding the EPA’s denial of a petition to regulate greenhouse gas 
emissions from motor vehicles, the D.C. Circuit Court noted findings of the National Research 
Council that a “‘causal linkage’ between greenhouse gas emissions and global warming ‘cannot 
be unequivocally established.’” Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50, 57 (D.C. Cir. 2005) 
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The polemic regarding the actual consequences of global 
warming is now moving from the political and scientific arenas into 
the courtroom. In the aftermath of Katrina, a New Orleans firm filed 
a complaint in federal court against oil companies, alleging that these 
fossil-fuel based businesses constitute the “greatest single source” of 
global warming and that these companies generated “conditions 
whereby a storm of the strength and size of Hurricane Katrina would 
inevitably form and strike the Mississippi Gulf Coast.”11 Some view 
these suits as a necessary mechanism to redress injuries resulting from 
negligent actions of oil companies; others believe that such attorney-
led conflicts are merely “a sobering reminder of our litigation-crazed 
society.”12
Regardless of the motivation underlying these claims, one 
threshold consideration stands between the plaintiffs and any 
favorable judgment: legal standing. It is “common understanding” 
that in order for a federal court to assert jurisdiction over a particular 
matter, the petitioner must prove that she has standing to sue.13 In 
other words, the petitioner must prove to the court that her claim is 
fit for its adjudication. Thus, before a judge can award a favorable 
verdict to a plaintiff for a defendant’s contributions to global 
warming, the plaintiff must first satisfy this “threshold jurisdictional 
question.”14
This Comment argues that petitioners seeking redress for injuries 
that they have suffered from a defendant’s contributions to global 
warming cannot establish legal standing in a federal court. To 
develop and support this conclusion, this Comment first argues that 
(quoting NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, CLIMATE CHANGE SCIENCE: AN ANALYSIS OF SOME OF 
THE KEY QUESTIONS 17 (2001)).  
 11. Ben Bain & Pattie Waldmeir, Lawyers Aim To Pin Blame for Katrina on Big 
Business, FIN. TIMES (London), Oct. 22, 2005, at 4; see also Ne’er Sue Wells, INVESTOR’S BUS. 
DAILY, Oct. 28, 2005, at A12; Hurricane Katrina: Class-Action Lawsuits Blame Oil 
Companies for Global Warming, Wetland Damage, GREENWIRE, Oct. 20, 2005. The plaintiffs 
in one lawsuit claim that “‘[d]espite warning from scientists . . . about the adverse effects of 
their activities on the environment in general and global warming in particular,’ the oil 
companies ‘have continued to engage in or increase the activities that have increased Global 
Warming.’” Id. 
 12. Id. (quoting Dave Gardner, Spokesman, Exxon Mobil Corp., and defendant in one 
of the global warming lawsuits). 
 13. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 102 (1998) (quoting 
Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990)). 
 14. Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 102 (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 
(1990)). 
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plaintiffs will fail to satisfy the constitutional requirements of 
standing on three different bases: (1) they will be unable to prove 
that the global warming resulting from the defendant’s carbon 
dioxide emissions is the likely cause of their injury; (2) where they 
allege that the defendant’s actions will cause a future injury, they will 
be unable to prove that the injury will occur imminently; and (3) 
they will fail to prove that carbon dioxide emissions of a particular 
entity caused their injuries. These conclusions stem from the current 
uncertainty of the science regarding global warming―specifically, 
the causal link between global warming and natural disasters, and the 
speculative nature of the climate modeling underlying the science. 
Second, this Comment argues that until the science becomes more 
certain, the more probable way for plaintiffs to hold defendants 
accountable in a court of law for their influence on global warming is 
to claim a procedural rather than a substantive injury.15
Part II summarizes the facts of the two controlling cases on legal 
standing in today’s legal environment—Lujan v. Defenders of 
Wildlife16 and Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental 
Services17—and highlights the sections of the Court’s reasoning in 
these cases that are most relevant to how a court should analyze legal 
standing in global warming suits. Part III considers some global 
warming basics and accents some of the salient points of contention 
between proponents and opponents of global warming. Only a few 
cases treating legal standing for global warming injuries have made 
their way to federal courts, and the courts in those cases have yet to 
conduct an exhaustive analysis of all the elements of legal standing. 
For that reason, Part IV walks through each of the factors that 
plaintiffs will have to satisfy to meet the standard for legal standing in 
a federal court and evaluates the probability of proving these 
elements in global warming cases. Part V discusses the nature of a 
procedural injury and assesses how alleging such an injury would 
facilitate plaintiffs’ access to a federal court for adjudication of their 
global warming injuries. Part VI provides a hypothetical comparison 
to show the difference in outcomes between alleging a substantive 
 15. The scope of this Comment is restricted to global warming plaintiffs’ ability to bring 
their claims in federal courts. Certainly, plaintiffs may have the option of bringing some of 
their claims (primarily their state common law claims) in state court, but that is beyond the 
scope of this Comment. 
 16. 504 U.S. 555 (1992). 
 17. 528 U.S. 167 (2000). 
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injury versus a procedural injury. Part VII offers a concise 
conclusion. 
II. LEGAL STANDING 
Although serious arguments may exist over the consequences of 
global warming, what a petitioner must do to prove standing in a 
federal court is, by contrast, less disputed. Legal standing refers to a 
federal court’s duty to limit its jurisdiction to “actual cases or 
controversies.”18 In other words, the court must assure that the 
parties before it are genuinely adverse to each other and that they 
both have “personal stake[s]” in the outcome of the case.19 The 
court must make this initial determination before it can consider the 
merits of the case.20
Standing has two components: constitutional standing and 
prudential standing.21 Constitutional standing evolved from the 
clause in Article III of the Constitution that limits the jurisdiction of 
federal courts to cases and controversies.22 Plaintiffs must prove three 
elements to satisfy constitutional standing: (1) they have suffered an 
“injury in fact”; (2) their “injury in fact” was caused by the 
defendant’s actions; and (3) their “injury in fact” will be redressed by 
a favorable judgment from the court.23 However, even if a plaintiff 
passes the constitutional standing requirement, the plaintiff may still 
have to satisfy prudential standing, which consists of an additional 
number of court-imposed limitations to assure that the particular 
case or controversy is being brought by the proper party.24 Courts 
 18. Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 37 (1976) (“No principle is 
more fundamental to the judiciary’s proper role in our system of government than the 
constitutional limitation of federal-court jurisdiction to actual cases or controversies.” (citing 
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968))). 
 19. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 819 (1997). Standing is defined as “[a] party’s right 
to make a legal claim or seek judicial enforcement of a duty or right.” BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 1413 (7th ed. 1999). 
 20. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 88–89 (1998). 
 21. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975). 
 22. Peter A. Alpert, Citizen Suits Under the Clean Air Act, 16 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. 
REV. 283, 289 (1988). 
 23. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). 
 24. Alpert, supra note 22, at 288. The Supreme Court recognizes the prudential 
limitations of standing but treats the requirements of constitutional standing as the “core 
component of standing.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. For this reason, this Comment will address 
the requirements of prudential standing, but the focus of this Comment will be constitutional 
standing. 
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invoke prudential standing where the plaintiff lacks a clear statutory 
right to bring his cause of action.25 This implies that the plaintiff may 
still be denied legal standing―even if he has satisfied constitutional 
standing―where he brings a common law claim or a statutory claim 
under a statute that lacks a clear provision authorizing a suit 
pursuant to its terms. Principal among these prudential limitations is 
the requirement that the plaintiff’s injured interest falls within the 
scope of interests Congress intended to protect in enacting the 
statute pursuant to which the plaintiff files her claim.26  
To provide context for the analysis of how the courts could apply 
current case law to determine standing for plaintiffs in global 
warming suits, this Part will review the foundational cases from 
which the current standing law in the circuits has evolved. Although 
many cases have contributed to the current law of standing,27 this 
Part will focus on Lujan and Laidlaw because these are the two 
principal cases that every circuit relies upon when articulating the 
standard for proving legal standing.28
 25. William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 252 (1998). 
 26. Fed. Election Comm. v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 20 (1998). 
 27. See generally Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 83 (1998); 
Bennett v. Spear 520 U.S. 154 (1997); Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 889 
(1990); United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669 
(1973); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 728 (1972); Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. 
Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
 28. See generally Grassroots Recycling Network, Inc. v. EPA, 429 F.3d 1109, 1111–12 
(D.C. Cir. 2005); Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 418 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2005); Barnes v. 
Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729, 739 (6th Cir. 2005); Interfaith Cmty. Org. v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 
399 F.3d 248, 254 (3d Cir. 2005); O’Sullivan v. Chicago, 396 F.3d 843, 854 (7th Cir. 
2005); Mulder v. Lundberg, 154 F.App’x. 52, 54 (10th Cir. 2005); N.Y. Coastal P’ship, Inc. 
v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 341 F.3d 112, 116 (2d Cir. 2003); BCCA Appeal Group v. EPA, 
355 F.3d 817, 825 (5th Cir. 2003); Eddings v. Hot Springs, 323 F.3d 596, 602 (8th Cir. 
2003); Envtl. Def. Ctr., Inc. v. EPA, 344 F.3d 832, 863 (9th Cir. 2003); Friends for Ferrell 
Parkway v. Stasko, 282 F.3d 315, 320 (4th Cir. 2002); Koziara v. Casselberry, 392 F.3d 1302, 
1304 (11th Cir. 2004). The standard articulated in Lujan—injury in fact, causation, and 
redressability—and subsequently followed in Laidlaw refers to the requirements of 
constitutional standing. As previously mentioned, another aspect of legal standing is prudential 
standing. However, the Court in Lujan and Laidlaw did not find there to be a prudential 
standing issue, probably because the plaintiffs were clearly authorized to bring suit under the 
citizen suit provisions of the Endangered Species Act and the Clean Water Act. Prudential 
standing will be discussed later in this Comment. See infra Part IV.D.  
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A. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife 
In Lujan, the United States Supreme Court held that the 
plaintiffs lacked legal standing to challenge a regulation enacted by 
the government pursuant to the Endangered Species Act (ESA). 
Section 7(a)(2) of the ESA requires that a federal agency “insure that 
any action authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency” does 
not threaten any endangered species.29 In 1978, the Fish and 
Wildlife Service and the National Marine Fisheries Service issued a 
regulation on behalf of the Secretary of Interior and the Secretary of 
Commerce, which required federal agencies to abide by section 
7(a)(2)’s provisions for actions taken domestically as well as 
overseas.30 Eight years later, the Department of the Interior revised 
the regulation to narrow the scope of section 7(a)(2) to apply only 
to “actions taken in the Untied States or on the high seas.”31 In 
response, Defenders of Wildlife filed an action seeking to have the 
Secretary of Interior restore the initial regulation, making section 
7(a)(2)’s requirements equally applicable to domestic and foreign 
actions.32
The Court did not determine the merits of Defenders’ action 
because the Court held that it had failed to prove standing to 
challenge the regulation.33 Defenders relied on the injuries that 
would allegedly be sustained by two of its members34 if certain 
federal overseas projects were not constrained by the consultative 
procedures of the ESA.35 One member had previously traveled to 
Egypt where she had “observed the traditional habitat of the 
endangered Nile crocodile.”36 She intended to return to view the 
crocodile directly and claimed that she would suffer harm from 
federal participation in a project that would endanger the animal’s 
 29. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2000). 
 30. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 558 (1992). 
 31. Id. at 558–59. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 562. 
 34. An organization may bring a lawsuit on behalf of its members if three requirements 
are met: first, the individual members could prove standing if they were acting in their own 
capacity as plaintiff; second, the interests implicated by the action are consistent with the 
objectives of the organization; and third, the suit does not require any involvement of the 
individual members. See Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 181 
(2000) (quoting Hut v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977).  
 35. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 563. 
 36. Id. 
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habitat.37 Another member had previously visited Sri Lanka where 
she had examined the habitat of “endangered species such as the 
Asian elephant and the leopard.”38 She alleged that she would suffer 
harm from federal participation in a project that potentially 
threatened these species’ habitats, which she intended to visit again.39
In evaluating these members’ standing, the Court articulated a 
standard that has become the touchstone for legal standing. Writing 
for the majority, Justice Scalia stated that a long history of case law 
had established “the irreducible constitutional minimum of 
standing”: 
First, the plaintiff must have suffered an “injury in fact”—an 
invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and 
particularized, and (b) “actual or imminent, not ‘conjectural’ or 
‘hypothetical.’” Second, there must be a causal connection between 
the injury and the conduct complained of—the injury has to be 
“fairly . . . trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, 
and not . . . the result [of] the independent action of some third 
party not before the court.” Third, it must be “likely,” as opposed 
to merely “speculative,” that the injury will be “redressed by a 
favorable decision.”40
The Court’s rationale for denying standing centered on the 
members’ failure to demonstrate that they would sustain an 
“imminent injury.”41 One factor that led the Court to this 
conclusion was its inability to see how damage to a species so remote 
in location from the two members would cause them imminent 
injury.42 This finding was bolstered by the members’ lack of 
“concrete plans” to return to the actual locations in the near 
future.43 The Court concluded that the members’ professed intent to 
return “some day” was too open-ended to show that their alleged 
injuries were “certainly impending.”44  
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id.  
 40. Id. at 560–61 (citations omitted).  
 41. Id. at 564. 
 42. Id. Showing an “actual” injury was not relevant here because the plaintiffs were not 
alleging that they already suffered injury due to the foreign projects but that they would suffer 
injury in the future when they returned to Egypt and Sri Lanka to view the animals. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. In his concurrence, Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Souter, implied that if the 
two organization members in this case had already purchased plane tickets to visit Egypt and 
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The Court’s view of geographic remoteness as an impediment to 
proving imminent injury was reflected in the Court’s rejection of 
three different “novel” nexus theories of standing proposed by the 
plaintiffs.45 For example, the “‘animal nexus’” theory would allow a 
person living in San Diego, who had a great love for observing the 
behavior of gorillas, to have standing to sue a party for the harm it 
does to gorillas in Congo.46 According to the Court, such theories 
are “beyond all reason.”47 Apparently, the Court contemplated that a 
more reasonable geographic proximity to the allegedly harmful 
actions would provide better support to a likelihood of sustaining 
imminent injury. 
 The Court’s second basis for denying standing was the 
plaintiffs’ failure to show that a decision in their favor would redress 
their alleged injuries.48 The Court doubted whether requiring the 
Secretary of Interior to promulgate a new regulation would redress 
their injuries.49 First, the Court determined that a favorable 
judgment would not obligate the federal agencies funding the 
alleged harmful projects to comply with the Secretary’s action.50 
Second, even if the agencies were required to comply with the new 
regulation, the contribution of the agencies to the allegedly harmful 
projects was so minimal that the projects would continue operating 
with or without them.51
Sri Lanka, or at least had a determined date that they could tell the court that they would 
return to Egypt and Sri Lanka, then they may have satisfactorily proven that they would suffer 
immediate injury. Id. at 579 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 45. Id. at 565–67 (majority opinion). 
 46. See id. at 566. One of the other theories—the “ecosystem nexus” theory—
“propose[d] that any person who uses any part of a ‘contiguous ecosystem’ adversely affected 
by a funded activity has standing even if the activity is located a great distance away.” Id. at 
565. The other approach—the “vocation nexus” theory—posited that “anyone with a 
professional interest in such animals can sue.” Id. at 566. It is unnecessary to treat all three of 
the theories in the text of the Comment because the Court’s rejection of them is based on the 
same rationale, namely the attenuated connection of the challenged conduct and the injury 
caused by the geographic distance. 
 47. Id. Justice Scalia “categorically reject[ed]” the dissent’s position that the plaintiffs’ 
distance from the alleged harm was irrelevant. Id. at 567 n.3. 
 48. Id. at 568. The Court recognized the elements of causation and prudential 
limitations but did not apply an analysis of these factors to its opinion. 
 49. Id. at 568–69. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 571. For example, AID, an agency involved in one of the challenged foreign 
projects, contributed less than ten percent of the financing to the project. Id. 
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B. Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental Services 
In Laidlaw, the Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs had legal 
standing to challenge the defendant’s violations of a permit issued 
pursuant to the Clean Water Act (CWA).52 The defendant, a 
hazardous waste facility, possessed a permit pursuant to the CWA53 
to discharge treated water into a river.54 The facility had breached its 
permit limits nearly five hundred times over an eight-year period.55 
Friends of the Earth (FOE) filed a suit for the defendant’s permit 
violations.56 To support standing, FOE relied on the alleged injuries 
sustained by some of its members as a result of the permit 
violations.57 For example, one member claimed that he lived a half-
mile from the facility and the river, and that the river “looked and 
smelled polluted.”58 He claimed that he would have liked to engage 
in recreational activities in and around the river, such as swimming, 
but his concern about the pollution of the water prevented him from 
doing so.59
The Court was persuaded by such claims and held that FOE had 
legal standing to bring its cause of action. The Court based its 
holding on the same standing standard articulated in Lujan.60 Justice 
Ginsburg, writing for the majority, concluded that the plaintiffs had 
shown that they had suffered an injury-in-fact from the pollutant 
discharges.61 The Court found that the evidence clearly 
 52. Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 167 (2000). 
 53. 33 U.S.C.S. §§ 1251–1387 (2000).
 54. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 175–76. The permit was issued under the Clean Water Act or 
Federal Water Pollution Control Act, which allowed the defendant to discharge pollutants into 
the river as long as it did so within the limits set by the permit. Id. at 174. Mercury was the 
primary pollutant and subject of this case. Id. at 176. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 177. 
 57. Id. at 181–83. 
 58. Id. at 181. 
 59. See id. at 181–82. Another member alleged a similar complaint, stating that she lived 
two miles from the source of the pollution, which is where she had previously performed many 
recreational activities, such as birdwatching and walking; however, her concern for her health, 
due to the pollution, caused her to stop performing such activities. Id. at 182. 
 60. Id. at 180–81; see also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 
(1992). 
 61. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 183–85. Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, dissented 
and accused the Court of analyzing the question of injury to the plaintiffs in “the most casual 
fashion,” making a “sham” out of the injury-in-fact requirement. Id. at 201 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). He relied on the lower court’s finding that the discharges did not actually injure 
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demonstrated that the defendant had discharged pollutants in 
violation of its permit and that those violations “directly affected” 
the members’ “recreational, aesthetic, and economic interests.”62 
Unlike Lujan, where the plaintiffs’ allegations required the Court to 
speculate as to when their alleged injuries would occur, here the 
Court could conclude with certainty that FOE’s members had 
sustained actual, concrete injuries from the defendant’s conduct. 
The Court additionally held that FOE possessed standing 
because a favorable decision from the Court would provide them 
redress.63 The defendant argued that “[c]ivil penalties offer no 
redress to private plaintiffs . . . because they are paid to the 
government,” not to the individual plaintiffs.64 The Court disagreed 
and held that civil penalties can afford redress because they 
discourage wrongdoers from committing the same offense again.65 
The Court broadly held that any “sanction that effectively abates” a 
particular conduct “and prevents its recurrence provides a form of 
redress.”66
C.  Lujan and Laidlaw: A Comparison 
When determining plaintiffs’ legal standing to sue, federal courts 
are typically unflagging in introducing their analysis by citing to 
Lujan or Laidlaw.67 These two cases form an essential backdrop to 
evaluating how federal courts should determine standing in global 
warming cases. It is particularly important to understand that the 
the environment. Id. at 201. Justice Scalia allows for the possibility that plaintiffs, such as the 
ones in this case, could allege an injury to their recreational and aesthetic interests if they were 
more substantive. Id. at 200. For example, where one affiant had alleged that she was injured 
because she could not go to the river anymore, but she had only visited the river twice in the 
previous twenty years, her claim did not rise to the level of an injury-in-fact. Id. Scalia 
characterized such claims as “vague, contradictory, and unsubstantiated allegations of 
‘concern’ about the environment.” Id. at 201. 
 62. Id. at 183–84 (majority opinion). The claims in Laidlaw were not to “be equated 
with the speculative ‘some day’ intentions to visit endangered species halfway around the 
world.” Id. 
 63. Id. at 185–86. 
 64. Id. at 185. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 185–86. Justice Scalia found the Court’s treatment of redressability to be just 
as “cavalier” as its treatment of injury-in-fact. Id. at 202 (Scalia, J., dissenting). He emphasized 
that the purpose of “remediation” is to extend “relief specifically tailored to the plaintiff’s 
injury, and not any sort of relief that has some incidental benefit to the plaintiff.” Id. at 204. 
 67. See supra text accompanying notes 27–28. 
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holdings of these two cases are entirely consistent with each other; 
and given the facts, it should be no surprise that the Court came out 
differently in the two cases.68
It is no surprise that the Court found injury-in-fact in one case 
and not in the other. In Lujan, the plaintiffs claimed that they would 
suffer injury because federal agencies’ contributions to a project 
located in a third-world country almost 9000 miles away might cause 
harm to an animal that they might like to see in the undetermined 
future.69 In Laidlaw, the plaintiffs claimed that they had already 
suffered injury from a facility’s discharge of a powerful toxin into a 
river only a few miles away from their homes.70  
Making this distinction between these two holdings is relevant to 
global warming cases. In Lujan, it was not the geographic proximity 
per se that precluded the Court from granting standing, but rather 
the Court’s determination that the substantial distance between the 
affected animals and the plaintiffs precluded proof of “certainly 
impending” injuries.71 The Court acknowledged that a person who 
works or observes an animal everyday may be able to prove imminent 
injury, because it is likely that the individual would be planning on 
viewing the animal shortly after its death, which was caused by the 
federal project. The court need not speculate as to whether or not 
the individual will be injured in the imminent future. However, in 
the case of the individual who lives 9000 miles away from the animal, 
the court must speculate as to how soon the individual will suffer 
injury from the animal’s death. For this reason, the Court in Laidlaw 
had no difficulty finding that FOE members’ injury was imminent, 
given that they lived only a few miles from the polluted river and 
could be injured by contact with the river, or lack of contact, on any 
given day. 
The foregoing comparison between Lujan and Laidlaw applies 
to global warming suits because an obstacle that plaintiffs face is 
proving that an injury from a defendant’s carbon dioxide emissions, 
and ultimately global warming, is certainly impending. This 
Comment argues, however, that the current state of science and the 
  68. Clearly, the dissenters in these two cases would not agree with the consistency of 
these two decisions, but this is the author’s own interpretation.  
 69. Distance Calculator Between Cities, http://www.mapcrow.info (last visited Mar. 1, 
2006) (verifying the distance between the United States and Sri Lanka to be over 9000 miles). 
 70. 528 U.S. at 176 (describing mercury as “an extremely toxic pollutant”). 
 71. 504 U.S. at 565 n.3. 
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climate modeling used to predict the future impact of global 
warming are speculative and contested. Consequently, plaintiffs are 
unable to prove imminent injury in global warming suits. Global 
warming plaintiffs are in a position similar to that of the Lujan 
plaintiffs, having claims of imminent injury that amount to nothing 
more than uncertain, ‘some day’ intentions. 
In addition, it is no surprise that the Court found redressability 
satisfied in Laidlaw and not in Lujan. In Lujan, even if the agencies 
were completely enjoined from contributing to the foreign projects, 
these projects would have continued uninterrupted with their normal 
operations. In Laidlaw, civil penalties would have provided a 
deterrent to future violations of the permit and endangerment to the 
environment.  
These two decisions demonstrate how redressability should be 
applied in global warming cases. If plaintiffs can show injury-in-fact 
and causation, a favorable judgment by the court will provide 
redress. For example, if they can prove that a defendant’s emissions 
caused a hurricane that damaged their property, legal damages would 
redress their loss. If they can show that the emissions will cause a 
hurricane in the imminent future that will injure their property, civil 
penalties or injunctive relief will deter the defendants from 
continuing to produce emissions at their current rate, mitigating the 
influence of global warming and possibly decreasing the chances of 
future destruction to their property.  
III. GLOBAL WARMING 
Global warming, a result of the greenhouse effect, “has become 
the overriding environmental concern since the 1990s.”72 The 
driving force of the greenhouse effect is the greenhouse gases—
carbon dioxide, water vapor, methane, nitrous oxide, and ozone.73 
The earth absorbs incoming solar radiation in order to fuel its 
various needs.74 To prevent overheating, the earth radiates this 
energy back into space, but greenhouse gases trap a substantial 
 72. BJORN LOMBORG, THE SKEPTICAL ENVIRONMENTALIST: MEASURING THE REAL 
STATE OF THE WORLD 258 (2001). Worldwatch Institute has stated that during this century 
“the climate battle may assume the kind of strategic importance that wars—both hot and 
cold—have had during” the prior century. Id.  
 73. Id. at 259. 
 74. LYDIA DOTTO, STORM WARNING: GAMBLING WITH THE CLIMATE OF OUR PLANET 
31 (1999). 
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portion of the heat before it entirely dissipates into space, keeping 
the earth warm.75
As one expert explained, this natural phenomenon is the 
“ultimate good news/bad news story.”76 On one hand, if it were not 
for the greenhouse effect, “the average temperature on the Earth 
would be approximately 33°C (59°F) colder and it is unlikely that 
life as we know it would be able to exist.”77 The bad news—at least 
to some scientists and an ever-increasing portion of the population—
is the “anthropogenic greenhouse effect,” or the extra warming to 
the earth produced by human activities.78 Since pre-industrial times, 
the atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide has risen by thirty 
percent.79
The extent of human contributions to global warming, however, 
remains a hotly-contested issue within the scientific and political 
communities.80 The words penned by Shakespeare in The Merchant 
of Venice seem particularly poignant to this conflict: “The devil can 
cite Scripture for his purpose.”81 This is not to say that either side of 
the global warming debate has a more morally-grounded, logically 
sound, or scientifically correct position. Rather, both parties possess 
an abundance of credible, provocative, and persuasive data to 
corroborate their respective positions on the issue. 
The result of all this conflicting research is a pervasive incertitude 
within the scientific community with respect to the effects of global 
warming, which creates an obstacle for courts. According to the 
standard articulated in Lujan, a court is required to determine 
whether the defendant’s contributions to global warming have 
inflicted or will inflict an injury to a concrete, particularized interest 
 75. Id. at 32. 
 76. Id. at 31. 
 77. LOMBORG, supra note 72, at 260. 
 78. Id. 
 79. MARK MASLING, GLOBAL WARMING: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 10 (2004). 
About fifty-five percent of the carbon dioxide that is released into the atmosphere is absorbed 
again by the environment, but the remaining forty-five percent is added to the atmosphere. 
LOMBORG, supra note 72, at 260. 
 80. See, e.g., PATRICK J. MICHAELS, MELTDOWN: THE PREDICTABLE DISTORTION OF 
GLOBAL WARMING BY SCIENTISTS, POLITICIANS, AND THE MEDIA 22 (2004). But see ROSS 
GELBSPAN, BOILING POINT: HOW POLITICIANS, BIG OIL AND COAL, JOURNALISTS, AND 
ACTIVISTS HAVE FUELED THE CLIMATE CRISIS—AND WHAT WE CAN DO TO AVERT 
DISASTER 19–20 (2004). 
 81. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE act 1, sc. 2. 
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of the plaintiff and that the injury has occurred or will occur 
imminently. However, the conflicting science impedes courts from 
making that determination. If the scientists and academics cannot 
arrive at a consensus regarding the actual consequences of global 
warming, how can a court of law conclude that the defendant’s 
emissions, which contribute to global warming, inflict an injury-in-
fact on the plaintiff or that the injury will occur imminently? It 
cannot, for the science fails to furnish the courts with the reasonable 
level of certainty required by the law. In order to illustrate the nature 
of this uncertainty, this Part presents three areas in which the parties 
to this debate disagree: (1) the validity of the findings of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC); (2) the link 
between global warming and melting ice; and (3) the link between 
global warming and hurricanes. 
A. The Proponents 
1. IPCC 
Adherents to the position supporting the dangers of global 
warming attribute substantial credence to the findings and the 
assessments of the IPCC.82 In its 1995 report, the IPCC concluded 
that “evidence suggests a discernible human influence on the global 
climate.”83 Its 2001 report stated that “[t]here is new and stronger 
evidence that most of the warming observed over the last 50 years is 
attributable to human activities.”84 Its 2001 report has been 
characterized “as the most comprehensive study on the subject to 
date,” and the head of the U.N. Environment Program stated that 
 82. The IPCC was established in 1988 in order “to assess on a comprehensive, 
objective, open and transparent basis the scientific, technical and socio-economic information 
relevant to understanding the scientific basis of risk of human-induced climate change, its 
potential impacts and options for adaptation and mitigation.” See IPCC Home, About IPCC, 
www.ipcc.ch/about/about.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2006). 
 83. Andrew Revkin, Ideas & Trends; All That Hot Air Must Be Having an Effect, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 12, 2003, § 4, at 5. The 1995 assessment predicted that “Earth’s average 
temperature could rise by as much as 10.4 degrees over the next 100 years.” Philip P. Pan, 
Scientists Issue Dire Prediction on Warming; Faster Climate Shift Portends Global Calamity This 
Century, WASH. POST, Jan. 23, 2001, at A1. 
 84. IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2001: SYNTHESIS REPORT 5 (2001), available at 
http://www.ipcc.ch/pub/un/syreng/spm.pdf. 
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the report’s findings “should sound alarm bells in every national 
capital and in every local community.”85
2. Melting ice 
Some see the dangers of global warming manifest in the 
increasing amount of ice melting across the world. In 1980, a large 
ice sheet in the Arctic called the Ward Hunt Ice Shelf was 150 feet 
thick, but by 2003, it had dwindled down to less than half of that 
measurement.86 NASA has determined that the ice overlaying the 
Arctic Ocean is disappearing “at an astonishing rate”—about nine 
percent every decade.87 Some scientists believe that within the next 
twenty years, the ice cap on Kenya’s Mount Kilimanjaro will 
completely melt.88
3. Hurricanes 
The recent string of hurricanes has led some to attribute the 
cause of these powerful forces of nature to global warming. The 
2005 hurricane season “was the worst since recordkeeping began 
151 years ago.”89 Dr. Greg Holland of the National Center on 
Atmospheric Research has recently said that although global 
warming may not be linked to an increase in the number of 
hurricanes, it is linked to more intense hurricanes.90 Dr. Kerry 
Emanuel of MIT recently published a study finding that “the 
intensity of storms has essentially doubled in the past 30 years.”91
B.  The Opponents 
1. IPCC 
Global warming skeptics, however, question the reliability of the 
IPCC’s conclusions. One study determined that only one-third of 
the more than 200 “lead authors” of the assessments are actually 
 85. Pan, supra note 83, at A1. 
 86. GELBSPAN, supra note 80, at 19–20. 
 87. Id. at 21. 
 88. Id. at 22. 
 89. Valerie Bauerlein, Hurricane Debate Shatters Civility of Weather Science, WALL ST. 
J., Feb. 2, 2006, at A1. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
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climate scientists.92 Some researchers believe that the analysis upon 
which the IPCC’s reports rely, which demonstrates that the earth’s 
last one hundred years have been substantially hotter than past 
centuries, is replete with “collation errors, unjustifiable truncation or 
extrapolation of source data, [and] obsolete data,”93 and fails “to 
support that the late twentieth-century climate is unusually warm.”94 
Richard Lindzen, MIT professor and coauthor of the IPCC’s 1995 
report, criticizes the Summary for Policymakers, a twenty-page 
summary of a nearly 3000 page report from which most cite, saying 
that “[t]he summary is written by 14 of the hundreds of scientists 
that contributed. Is that a consensus? I don’t think so.”95
2.  Melting ice 
Some scientists believe that the world’s melting ice is not a result 
of the reported recent warmer temperatures and that these 
temperatures are not unusual when considered in the context of the 
last century of the earth’s history.96 Some climatologists believe that 
precipitation is the cause of Mount Kilimanjaro’s vanishing ice—not 
rising temperatures.97 Scientists have noted that Africa actually had a 
much warmer climate 4000 to 11,000 years ago than it has today, 
“yet Kilimanjaro was much more glaciated because it was also wetter 
than it is today.”98 One scientist determined that since 1940, 
temperatures in the Arctic have been declining.99
 92. MICHAELS, supra note 80, at 22. They concluded that “the ‘consensus’ that these 
documents achieve is in fact determined by a majority opinion that is not necessarily formally 
trained in the subject matter.” Id. 
 93. Editorial, Kyoto’s Dead Hand, WALL ST. J., Dec. 10, 2005, at A10. 
 94. Ross McKitrick, Hockey Stick: Climate Is Not Unusually Warm, WALL ST. J., Dec. 
23, 2005, at A15. 
 95. Fred Guterl, The Truth About Global Warming, NEWSWEEK, July 23, 2001, at 44 
(quoting Richard Lindzen). Richard Lindzen wrote that the IPCC’s 1995 assessment “takes 
great pains to point out that the statement has no implications for the magnitude of the effect, 
is dependent on the [dubious] assumption that natural variability obtained from [computer] 
models is the same as that in nature, and, even with these caveats, is largely a subjective 
matter.” Id. 
 96. MICHAELS, supra note 80, at 43. 
 97. See id. at 36. 
 98. Id. 
 99. See id. at 45. 
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Dr. William Gray disagrees with the alleged causal link between 
global warming and hurricanes. In recent testimony before 
Congress, Dr. Gray stated his belief that human influence has not 
caused the recent rash of intense hurricanes.100 He “believes the 
current era of high activity will eventually end as a result of changes 
in salinity and currents in the Atlantic.”101 Dr. Patrick J. Michaels 
says that the storm trend that the Atlantic experienced last year was 
similar to storm activity in the 1940s and 1950s, which was followed 
by a period of weaker hurricanes.102 In sum, “there has been no 
trend in hurricane intensity.”103
C.  Conclusion 
The global warming discussion is similarly schismatic regarding 
the link between global warming and other natural events, such as 
floods, fires, and disease.104 The objective of this Comment is not to 
declare which of these two parties is correct. The purpose of this 
 100. Bauerlein, supra note 89, at A1. A climatologist from the Georgia Institute of 
Technology in Atlanta disagrees with Dr. Gray’s research and accuses of him having what she 
calls “brain fossilization.” Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Michaels, supra note 6. Dr. Michaels teaches environmental science at the 
University of Virginia, “is one of the most popular lecturers in the nation on the subject of 
global warming,” and is a contributing author and reviewer of the IPCC. See Cato Institute, 
Patrick J. Michaels, http://www.cato.org/people/michaels.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2006). 
 103. Michaels, supra note 6. 
 104. The three disputed points with respect to global warming represent a mere sampling 
of the range of matters upon which the different sides of the global warming debate disagree. 
See generally Fred Pearce, Drought Bumps Up Global Thermostat, NEW SCIENTIST, Aug. 4, 
2005 (arguing recent forest fires and droughts were caused by global warming); Report: Global 
Warming To Bring Farming Woes, SALT LAKE TRIB., May 28, 2000 (arguing that global 
warming leads to increased pests and injury to agriculture); Nancy Shute, The Weather Turns 
Wild: Global Warming Could Cause Droughts, Disease, and Political Upheaval, U.S. NEWS, 
Feb. 5, 2001, at 44 (arguing that global warming results in floods, disease, forest fires, and 
rising sea levels). But see Thomas H. Maugh II, The Flip Side of Global Warming Agriculture: 
An EPA-Commissioned Study Says the Greenhouse Effect Would Actually Boost Overall Farm 
Production in the U.S., L.A. TIMES, May 17, 1990 (arguing that global warming may produce 
greater crop yields); MICHAELS, supra note 80, at 142–46 (arguing that global warming has 
not resulted in increased forest fires); S. Fred Singer, Global-Warming Theory Steams Ahead 
Despite Conflicting Evidence, INSIGHT ON THE NEWS, Feb. 26, 2001, at 46 (arguing that 
global warming has not resulted in warmer temperatures); S. Fred Singer, The Sky Isn’t Falling, 
and the Ocean Isn’t Rising, WALL ST. J. (Brussels), Nov. 11, 1997, at 10 (arguing that global 
warming is not resulting in rising sea levels). 
3BERTAGNA.FIN.DOC 5/12/2006 10:51:07 AM 
415] “Standing” Up for the Environment 
 433 
 
Comment, rather, is to show that it is safe to say that the science is 
not settled on this issue, which poses a substantial obstacle to 
plaintiffs attempting to prove legal standing in a federal court in 
order to receive redress for the injuries that they allege are caused by 
global warming—an obstacle that Lujan, Laidlaw, and subsequent 
case law will not accommodate. 
IV. LEGAL STANDING, GLOBAL WARMING, 
AND SUBSTANTIVE INJURY 
An understanding of the present state of global warming science 
is important because this science will overlay a court’s analysis as to 
whether plaintiffs are entitled to a federal court’s resolution of their 
claim. Global warming plaintiffs will be attempting to prove 
constitutional and prudential standing for claims of substantive injury 
brought pursuant to either a federal statute105 or under the common 
law.106 A substantive injury is distinguished from procedural injury in 
that the latter results solely from a government entity’s failure to 
comply with requisite procedures, and the former does not.107 
Presently, the principal statute under which plaintiffs have alleged 
substantive injury from global warming is the Clean Air Act 
(CAA),108 and the primary common law theory under which plaintiffs 
have sought redress is public nuisance.109 Regardless of whether the 
 105. Many major environmental statutes contain citizen suit provisions that authorize 
private parties to stand in the shoes of the government to sue “when it is unable or unwilling 
to take action.” Cox v. Dallas, 256 F.3d 281, 291 n.18 (5th Cir. 2001); see also Clean Air Act, 
42 U.S.C. § 7604 (2000); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2000); Resource Conservation 
and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (2000). 
 106. A nuisance theory of recovery “lends itself naturally to combating the harms created 
by environmental problems.” Cox, 256 F.3d at 291. For plaintiffs to bring a nuisance action 
against a party, diversity of citizenship must exist in order for a federal court to have 
jurisdiction. Frey v. EPA, 270 F.3d 1129, 1136–37 (7th Cir. 2001). Moreover, plaintiffs will 
not be able to bring a nuisance action against the EPA or a different federal government 
agency. Id. 
 107. See infra text accompanying notes 216–28. 
 108. Massachusetts v. EPA., 415 F.3d 50, 50 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
 109. See generally Korsinsky v. EPA, No. 05 Civ. 859, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21778 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2005); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Watson, No. C 02–4106 JSW, 2005 
WL 2035596, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2005). The reason plaintiffs would prefer to seek 
relief under a common law theory rather than a citizen suit provision is that citizen suit 
provisions allow private parties to act as “private attorneys general,” which generally restricts 
the remedies that they can seek to injunctions and civil penalties. See Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. 
Lamphier, 714 F.2d 331, 336–37 (4th Cir. 1983) (holding that the Clean Water Act does not 
authorize private plaintiffs to recover monetary relief). Global warming plaintiffs may certainly 
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legal basis for the plaintiffs’ injuries is a statutory or a common law 
theory, plaintiffs must still prove legal standing to adjudicate their 
claims in a federal court.110  
This Part argues that given the framework of Lujan and Laidlaw, 
plaintiffs will fail to prove constitutional standing on two different 
fronts. First, they will fail to satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement 
because they cannot conclusively demonstrate that the global 
warming produced by the defendant’s carbon dioxide emissions 
creates an actual injury, and they cannot prove that a future injury 
from such emissions will be imminent. Second, plaintiffs will fail to 
prove causation because the current state of science does not afford a 
court the ability to trace the alleged injury to a particular defendant’s 
emissions with the requisite level of certainty.  
A. Injury-in-Fact 
Global warming has the potential to impact a large segment of 
the human population, and for that reason, the injury-in-fact 
requirement seeks to assure courts that the petitioner has an interest 
distinct from the larger general population.111 This prong of the 
analysis seeks to save the courts from needlessly consuming their 
resources adjudicating the claims of every “roving environmental 
ombudsman” who wants to right all the alleged wrongs perpetrated 
by global warming.112  
Applying the Lujan standard to global warming cases, the first 
component of constitutional standing—injury-in-fact—requires the 
plaintiff to prove two aspects of her injury: the nature of her injury 
and the timing of her injury. With respect to the nature of the injury, 
receive redress by halting ongoing violations that may harm them if continued or by providing 
deterrent measures through the imposition of civil penalties, but plaintiffs generally will not be 
able to seek monetary relief for their injuries pursuant to a citizen suit provision in a federal 
statute. Congress has made it clear that both the Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act 
“expressly exclude damage actions.” Torres Maysonet v. Drillex, 229 F. Supp. 2d 105, 108–09 
(D.P.R. 2002) (quoting 116 CONG. REC. 33104 (1970) (statement of Sen. Muskie)); see also 
Green Hills, L.L.C. v. Aaron Streit, Inc., 361 F. Supp. 2d 81, 85 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (holding 
that the citizen suit provision of the RCRA provides injunctive relief but not legal damages). 
 110. See, e.g., Korsinsky, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21778 at *6–7; Cox, 256 F.3d at 305–
08 (showing that a petitioner must still prove standing to bring a nuisance claim); NAACP v. 
Acusport Corp., 210 F.R.D. 446, 459–61 (E.D.N.Y. 2003).  
 111. See Friends of the Earth v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d 149, 156 (4th 
Cir. 2000). 
 112. Id. at 157. 
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she must allege an injury that is both “concrete” and 
“particularized.”113 With respect to the timing of the injury, she must 
allege an injury that is either “actual” (an injury that she has already 
sustained) or an injury that will occur in the “imminent” future.114 
This Part respectively analyzes four components of the injury-in-fact 
analysis: (1) concrete injury; (2) particularized injury; (3) actual 
injury; and (4) imminent injury. This Part argues that global 
warming plaintiffs will have little trouble demonstrating a concrete, 
particularized injury. However, they will fail to prove that they have 
suffered an actual or imminent injury from a defendant’s carbon 
emissions because current science precludes them from proving that 
global warming has caused or will cause their injury, and that their 
injury will be suffered imminently.  
1. Concrete injury 
Plaintiffs will be able to demonstrate a concrete injury. 
Consistent with the standard enunciated in Lujan, a court will grant 
standing to a global warming plaintiff only if that plaintiff alleges 
injury to a concrete interest.115 A concrete interest can consist of an 
economic, recreational, or aesthetic interest of the plaintiff.116 Thus, 
in addition to alleging harm to something that is of a pecuniary 
value, a plaintiff may allege that he “uses, or would use more 
frequently, an area affected by the alleged[ly]” harmful emissions of 
an entity and “that [her] aesthetic or recreational interests in the area 
have been harmed.”117
 113. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 563 (1992). 
 114. Id. 
 115. Baur v. Veneman, 352 F.3d 625, 632 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 116. Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 184 (2000). It even 
appears that some courts consider a spiritual interest a concrete interest. In Defenders of 
Wildlife v. Enviromental Protection Agency, the plaintiffs liked to watch and take pictures of 
different animal species, as well as hike and camp in their habitats. 420 F.3d 946, 956 (9th Cir. 
2005). The Ninth Circuit determined that they had a sufficient concrete interest because their 
activities in those habitats brought them “recreational, aesthetic, and spiritual fulfillment,” and 
the EPA’s failure to abide by the provisions of the Endangered Species Act threatened those 
interests. Id. (emphasis added). 
 117. Sierra Club v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 430 F.3d 1337, 1344 (11th Cir. 2005); see also 
Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 184; Wilderness Soc’y v. Norton, No. 05-5032, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 
1019, at *10–11 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 17, 2006); Tex. Indep. Producers & Royalty Owners Ass’n v. 
EPA, 410 F.3d 964, 972 (7th Cir. 2005); Sausalito v. O’Neill, 386 F.3d 1186, 1199 (9th Cir. 
2004); NRA of Am. v. Magaw, 132 F.3d 272, 293 (6th Cir. 1997). 
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Residents of the Gulf Coast suffered tremendous losses as a result 
of Hurricane Katrina. A New Orleans resident who lost her home to 
the hurricane has suffered an economic injury. A resident who claims 
he can no longer enjoy boating or hunting along the Mississippi 
River has suffered a recreational injury.118 A resident (or even a 
tourist) of New Orleans who cannot fully appreciate the French 
Quarter or New Orleans’s wildlife preserves has suffered an aesthetic 
injury.119 The requirement of showing an injury to a concrete interest 
will not prove to be a substantial obstacle to global warming 
plaintiffs. 
2. Particularized injury 
Global warming plaintiffs will be able to satisfy a court that they 
have suffered a particularized injury. Lujan requires that the injury 
not only be concrete but also particularized. In other words, the 
plaintiff must show that a company or federal agency’s contributions 
to global warming impacted upon her “in a personal and individual 
way.”120 This requirement bars “those with merely generalized 
grievances from bringing suit to vindicate an interest common to the 
entire public.”121 For example, a resident of Alaska who loves polar 
bears, works with them extensively, and observes them frequently in 
the zoo, might claim that global warming has caused the sea levels to 
rise in the Arctic, endangering polar bears.122 She may claim that she 
has sustained a particularized injury to her aesthetic interest in 
observing polar bears in safe, healthy surroundings.123 Since she 
could claim that she had directly observed polar bears becoming sick 
 118. See Sierra Club, 430 F.3d at 1345. 
 119. Areas such as New Orleans attract a large amount of tourism. A search of tourist 
web sites will show that there are many attractions, such as steamboat tours, that are shut 
down due to Hurricane Katrina. See, e.g., Trip Advisor, www.tripadvisor.com/Attractions-
g60864-Activities-c25-New_Orleans_Louisiana.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2006). 
 120. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 575 n.1 (1992). 
 121. Friends of the Earth v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d 149, 156 (4th 
Cir. 2000); see also Fed. Election Comm’n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 34–35 (1998) (stating that 
those with generalized grievances should pursue those claims in the political branches of the 
government, not within the judiciary). 
 122. See Jane Kay, Polar Bears To Be Considered for Threatened Species List, S.F. CHRON., 
Feb. 9, 2006, at A5. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service is currently studying the status of the 
polar bear species in light of significant climate changes in the Arctic in order to determine if it 
should list the polar bear as an endangered species. Id. If such a declaration is made, “it would 
be the first mammal deemed in danger of extinction because of global warming.” Id.
 123. Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Glickman, 154 F.3d 426, 432–33 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
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and dying from the dangerous conditions caused by global warming, 
she could claim that she had suffered “in a personal and individual 
way.”124
Some may misconstrue the courts’ refusal to adjudicate a 
generalized grievance to mean that only the plaintiff can suffer the 
injury to the exclusion of the general public.125 However, if that were 
the case, the widespread or global nature of global warming would 
largely bar plaintiffs’ claims. 
Even if it is “widely shared” by many other people, a plaintiff’s 
claim of injury may still be justiciable to the extent that the plaintiff 
can demonstrate that the defendant’s emissions affected her in a 
personal and individual way.126 Continuing with the polar bear 
example mentioned above, the Alaskan resident could plausibly be 
joined by thousands of other residents who claim a similar injury to 
their aesthetic interest in polar bears. Nonetheless, the widespread 
nature of the injury in the Arctic would be irrelevant as long as the 
plaintiff could prove that the adverse conditions caused by the 
defendant’s actions injured her in a personal, individual way.127
The plaintiffs in Massachusetts v. EPA failed to grasp the 
importance of particularizing the allegations to themselves rather 
than simply to the public at large.128 The plaintiffs wanted the court 
to require the EPA to regulate carbon dioxide emissions under the 
 124. See id. 
 125. See Akins, 524 U.S. at 34–35; Am. Canoe Ass’n v. La. Water & Sewer Comm’n, 
389 F.3d 536, 544–45 (6th Cir. 2004); Maroni v. Pemi-Baker Reg’l Sch. Dist., 346 F.3d 247, 
254 (1st Cir. 2003); Apache Bend Apartments v. United States, 987 F.2d 1174, 1176 (5th 
Cir. 1993); Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. Miller, 992 F.2d 1548, 1548 (11th Cir. 1993); Nat’l Fed’n of 
Fed. Employees v. Cheney, 883 F.2d 1038, 1047 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
 126. Akins, 524 U.S. at 24. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals credits the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Federal Election Commission v. Akins for reversing the tide of precedent 
from stressing the “widespread (or generalized) nature of an injury” to the concrete, 
particularized nature of the injury. See Covington v. Jefferson County, 358 F.3d 626, 651–52 
(9th Cir. 2004). This requirement that a plaintiff not bring a claim amounting to a generalized 
grievance is actually a prudential limitation on standing. See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. 
Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11 (2004). Although the analysis of this limitation may be appropriately 
placed in the prudential standing analysis, courts treat this limitation in conjunction with the 
injury-in-fact analysis of constitutional standing. It seems as though courts have more or less 
imported this prudential limitation into the injury-in-fact analysis. In Akins, the Supreme 
Court appears to accept that the generalized grievance limitation can be “styled as a 
constitutional or prudential limitation on standing.” 524 U.S. at 23. 
 127. See generally Baur v. Veneman, 352 F.3d 625 (2d Cir. 2004) (upholding plaintiff’s 
action against USDA to ban the use of “downed livestock” for human consumption). 
 128. Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50, 59–60 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
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Clean Air Act,129 but the court did not rule in favor of the plaintiffs. 
In his concurring opinion, Judge Sentelle concluded that the 
plaintiffs’ global warming claims amounted to an allegation that 
global warming was “harmful to humanity at large.”130 Even 
assuming that global warming is harmful to the general public, such 
a claim fails because it amounts to a generalized grievance on behalf 
of the public’s common welfare. It fails to constitute a particularized 
harm and fails to meet the standards recognized in Lujan and 
Laidlaw.131 Thus, if plaintiffs carefully articulate their injuries from 
global warming as affecting them personally, it will be immaterial 
“that legions of other persons” along the Gulf Coast or in the Arctic 
are similarly injured.132
3. Actual injury and imminent injury 
After the plaintiff has established that the nature of her injury is 
fit for adjudication—that it is concrete and particularized—she must 
still prove that her injury falls within the appropriate time frame, 
meaning that it has already occurred or will occur in the imminent 
future. Whether the injury is one that the plaintiff has already 
sustained from a defendant’s emissions (actual injury), or whether 
the injury is one that she will soon sustain from such emissions 
 129. Id. at 56. 
 130. Id. at 60. 
 131. Id. at 59–60. 
 132. Pye v. United States, 269 F.3d 459, 469 (4th Cir. 2001). One way that may 
significantly enhance the success of lawsuits seeking redress for global warming injuries is to 
have the state act as plaintiff. It may not be easy to show that a company’s emissions caused a 
specific hurricane, which then destroyed a particular house, or to show that a company caused 
the sea level to rise in a certain area, which then damaged the terrain of a particular piece of 
property. In these circumstances, one could attribute these damages to factors other than 
global warming. David A. Grossman, Warming Up to a Not-So-Radical Idea: Tort–Based 
Climate Change Litigation, 28 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 24–25 (2003). However, if the 
plaintiff is the state complaining of damaged roads or a lengthy, retreating shoreline, then it is 
easier to show that these damages are tied to global warming. Id. Another reason why having 
the state act as plaintiff may be effective is that individual plaintiffs lack the resources to litigate 
successfully against big oil and power companies with deep pockets. The advantage of having 
the state serve as plaintiff was illustrated in the tobacco litigation in the 1990s. Until the mid-
1990s, individual plaintiffs had won two out of some eight-hundred private actions against the 
tobacco companies. See Arthur B. LaFrance, Tobacco Litigation: Smoke, Mirrors and Public 
Policy, 26 AM. J.L. & MED. 187, 190 (2000). One of the crucial factors to the turn-around of 
the litigation against the tobacco companies was the involvement of attorneys general in 
pursuing state reimbursement claims for Medicaid and other health care expenditures, resulting 
in the tobacco companies incurring a long-term obligation of $240 billion. Id. at 191–92. 
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(imminent injury), is inconsequential.133 Plaintiffs will fail to prove an 
actual injury or imminent injury because they cannot prove that the 
ultimate consequence of the defendant’s emissions—global 
warming—caused or will cause their injury. This Part examines the 
inability of courts to hold that a plaintiff has demonstrated an injury-
in-fact as a result of the lack of science and the lack of law to sustain 
such a holding. The analysis that follows regarding the inability of 
courts to make such a holding applies to actual injury and imminent 
injury.  
It is important not to confuse causation analysis with this part of 
injury-in-fact analysis. Some may construe the analysis as involving 
two different causation inquiries: first, whether global warming itself, 
the by-product of carbon emissions, caused or will cause the injuries 
alleged by the plaintiff; and second, whether the defendant’s 
emissions provided the necessary impetus to global warming to 
create the natural disaster that caused the plaintiff’s alleged injuries. 
However, courts have narrowed the causation analysis to whether the 
injury can ultimately be traced to the actions of the specific 
defendant, as opposed to an independent third party. But before a 
court can determine if it was specifically the emissions of the named 
defendant that caused the injury, the court must first determine 
whether global warming in general, the result of carbon dioxide 
emissions that ultimately causes the natural event, is likely to have 
caused, or will imminently cause the alleged injury; the inquiry here 
concerns the likelihood that the defendant’s actions can cause the 
harm.134 If global warming is not the cause of hurricanes, floods, 
rising sea levels, or other natural events, then it is irrelevant that the 
defendant’s emissions may contribute to global warming. This initial 
inquiry falls under the injury-in-fact analysis.135
This initial analysis is challenging for the court because there are, 
in reality, only a few certainties with respect to global warming: (1) 
the earth’s mean temperature has risen by a little less than one 
degree Celsius over the last century; (2) the level of atmospheric 
carbon dioxide has increased over the last two centuries; and (3) 
 133. Sierra Club, Lone Star Chapter v. Cedar Point Oil Co., 73 F.3d 546, 556 (5th Cir. 
1996). 
 134. See Comm. to Save the Rio Hondo v. Lucero, 102 F.3d 445, 451 (10th Cir. 1996). 
 135. Id. 
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carbon dioxide has contributed to this warming.136 Part III 
established that beyond these facts, there is much uncertainty 
concerning the effects of global warming. A plaintiff whose house 
was destroyed by a hurricane cannot yet prove that global warming 
caused the hurricane. A plaintiff whose trees were damaged by spruce 
bark beetles cannot conclusively demonstrate that global warming 
caused an outbreak of the insect.137 Therefore, science does not yet 
provide the necessary consensus upon which a court can make a 
determination that the defendant’s emissions, which contribute to 
the earth’s warmer temperatures, are likely to contribute to the 
alleged actual or imminent injury. 
The inability and inappropriateness of courts holding that global 
warming was the cause of a natural disaster is reflected by the failure 
of legislators to make such a determination. Pursuant to the 
enactment of major environmental statutes such as the Clean Water 
Act and the Clean Air Act, congressional committees and federal 
agencies with expertise in the regulated area have performed a 
tremendous amount of research and evaluation to determine that 
certain pollutants, if present above certain thresholds, are toxic and 
harmful. For example, in Covington v. Jefferson County, in which a 
municipal landfill emitted CFCs and other ozone-depleting 
substances into the atmosphere, the court could rely on the 
acceptable limits for such emissions established by the Clean Air Act 
to objectively decide that the landfill’s actions were injurious.138 
Judge Gould’s concurring opinion relied on the “conclusive” science 
that the release of CFCs destroys stratospheric ozone, diminishing 
that layer of protection that humans have from radiation.139 It was 
this conclusive evidence regarding the dangers of CFCs that led 
 136. Mark LaRochelle & Peter Spencer, “Global Warming” Science: Fact vs. Fiction, 
CONSUMERS’ RES. MAG., July 2001, at 5; see also Patrick J. Michaels, Global Warming Is a 
Threat? It Just Ain’t So!, FREEMAN, Oct. 2005, at 6. 
 137. Jim Robbins, Beetles Taking a Devastating Toll on Western Forests, N.Y. TIMES, July 
13, 2004, at F4. Some scientists are attributing an increase in the spruce bark beetle 
population to warmer temperatures. Id. In Alaska, this insect has destroyed almost four million 
acres of white spruce trees. Id. In 2004, the beetle killed almost 600,000 acres of pine. Id. 
 138. See generally Covington v. Jefferson County, 358 F.3d 626, 626 (9th Cir. 
2004). Chlorofluorocarbons, or CFCs, are the byproduct of human activity that are chiefly 
responsible for the depletion of the earth’s ozone layer. Jennifer Woodward, Comment, 
Turning Down the Heat: What United States Laws Can Do To Help Ease Global Warming, 39 
AM. U. L. REV. 203, 210–11 (1989). The depletion of the ozone layer facilitates the warming 
of the earth. Id. 
 139. Covington, 358 F.3d at 650. 
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Congress to regulate CFCs, and courts should defer to that 
judgment.140
However, in the context of greenhouse gas emissions, plaintiffs 
do not have this type of objective consensus from this country’s 
legislators. The lack of political consensus poses problems because it 
results in a lack of legal standards and regulations that can guide a 
court in deciding whether a defendant’s emissions caused, or will 
cause, an injury. In most environmental cases, a court looks to a 
statute like the Clean Air Act or Clean Water Act and can then issue 
a holding that the defendant’s discharge of emissions of a particular 
pollutant was clearly harmful. In the context of greenhouse gases, 
courts have no law to rely on to make such determinations.  
The federal government under the Bush administration has not 
imposed mandatory limits on carbon dioxide.141 In Massachusetts v. 
 140. Id. In Covington, the county constructed a waste landfill directly across the street 
from a couple’s home. Id. at 633. Several inspections revealed that that the landfill was being 
improperly maintained. Id. at 634. The couple filed an action under the RCRA and CAA 
against the county and inspecting entity, and the court held that the plaintiffs had standing 
under both statutes. Id. In an article by Bradford Mank, he applied the reasoning of the court 
in Covington, particularly that of the concurring opinion, to argue that certain plaintiffs should 
have standing to file global warming suits. Bradford C. Mank, Standing and Global Warming: 
Is Injury to All Injury to None?, 35 ENVTL. L. 63–64 (2005). However, the facts of Covington 
are distinguishable from those in a global warming suit. In Covington, the plaintiffs were right 
across the street from a landfill. 358 F.3d at 638. They were “directly confronted with risks” 
by the landfill’s violations of the RCRA, such as fires, scavengers, and groundwater 
contamination. Id. at 639. In terms of causation, there was no doubt that the county’s failure 
to properly maintain a waste landfill just across the street from the plaintiffs caused 
“‘reasonable concern’ of injury” to the plaintiffs. Id. In its passage of the RCRA, Congress 
agreed that the improper handling of hazardous waste may indeed cause reasonable concern of 
injury to another. The alleged harm under the CAA was a result of the release of CFCs. Id. at 
640. Unlike greenhouse gases and like carbon dioxide, there has been sufficient consensus on 
the dangers of CFCs and other ozone depleting substances. In 1990, Congress enacted a new 
version of the CAA, which placed “stringent guidelines that mandate the phase-out of all 
ozone-depleting substances.” Nancy D. Adams, Title VI of the 1990 Clean Air Act and State 
and Local Initiatives To Reverse the Stratospheric Ozone Crisis: An Analysis of Preemption, 19 
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 173, 191 (1991). The problem is that the science is not conclusive 
with respect to global warming, and there is no judgment of Congress on global warming to 
which a federal court can defer. See infra Part IV.B. This Comment does not agree with 
Mank’s conclusion that the reasoning in Covington is persuasive in the context of global 
warming suits. One of the other primary issues that this Comment has with Mank’s article is 
his acceptance of the growing evidence of global warming and its negative consequences. This 
Comment, for reasons discussed in Part III, does not agree that the science is adequately 
conclusive to warrant a court’s determination of causation between greenhouse gas emissions 
and certain natural events. 
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EPA, the court determined that the EPA has solid policy reasons not 
to impose mandatory limits on carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous 
oxide, and hydrofluorocarbons.142 Although this fact may terminate a 
plaintiff’s chances of succeeding under the Clean Air Act, a plaintiff 
can still make a claim under public nuisance. Alternatively, a plaintiff 
may creatively argue that the claim falls within the scope of another 
statute. In conclusion, regardless of whether a plaintiff is alleging an 
actual or imminent injury, the courts simply lack the scientific and 
legal foundation that would allow them to determine that a 
defendant’s carbon emissions, and ultimately global warming, caused 
or will cause a hurricane, flood, or some other natural disaster. 
In reality, this initial inquiry is contingent on what side the court 
takes on the global warming issue. In Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. 
Watson, the district court accepted the evidence at face value as 
proving the adverse consequences of global warming.143 On the 
other hand, in Massachusetts v. EPA, the D.C. Circuit Court of 
Appeals vocalized its position that the science is not conclusive 
regarding the harm posed by global warming.144 Nonetheless, to 
proceed, this analysis assumes that a court accepts the science 
supporting the harmful effects of global warming. In this case, the 
plaintiff must appropriately articulate her injury as one that has 
already occurred. This showing is fairly straightforward and needs 
little explanation. A resident of Oklahoma, for example, may allege 
that the forest fires that took his home and ravaged over 200,000 
acres of the state by the end of 2005 were a product of global 
warming.145 Farmers could allege that hotter temperatures in 2005, 
which caused them a shortfall in their grain production, were a 
product of global warming.146
 141. Juliet Eilperin, 3 States Seek Emissions Pact; Western Officials To Use Northeastern 
Agreement as Model, WASH. POST, Aug. 25, 2005, at A2; see, e.g., Global Climate Protection 
Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-204, §§ 1102–03, 101 Stat. 1331. 
 142. 415 F.3d 50, 57–59 (D.C. Cir. 2005); see also Juliet Eilperin, Court Backs EPA on 
Lack of Greenhouse Gas Limits, WASH. POST, July 16, 2005, at A9. 
 143. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Watson, No. C 02–4106 JSW, 2005 WL 2035596, 
at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2005). 
 144. 415 F.3d 50 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
 145. Bryan Bender, Rough Weather Plagues Points West, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan 3, 2006, at 
A2. In response to a rash of forest fires off the coast of Florida in 1998, President Bill Clinton 
linked global warming to the fires and warned that “[w]e’re going to have more things like this 
happen.” For the Record, NAT’L REV., Aug. 3, 1998. 
 146. Editorial, Coal’s Global Toll, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 27, 2004, at A16; see 
GELBSPAN, supra note 80, at 147–48. 
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4. Imminent injury 
Where the plaintiff alleges a future injury, he will not only fail for 
the reasons discussed in the previous section, but he will also fail 
because he will be unable to establish the imminence of the injury. 
Courts want to be sure that a plaintiff is alleging an injury that is 
likely to occur.147 Courts refuse to adjudicate injury claims that are 
merely “an ingenious academic exercise in the conceivable.”148 For 
this reason, courts have placed a restraint on the time frame in which 
the alleged injury must occur—the “imminent” future.149 In Lujan, 
the Supreme Court provided a little more substance to this restraint 
by describing it to mean “certainly impending.”150
The global warming plaintiff will not be able to prove imminent 
injury because any injury alleged to occur in the future as a 
consequence of global warming is a matter of probability. The D.C. 
 147. Idaho Conservation League v. Mumma, No. 90-35796, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 
9031, at *27 (9th Cir. May 6, 1992).
 148. United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 
669, 688 (1973). 
 149. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). Where a federal 
court attempts to adjudicate an issue that does not constitute a case or controversy, it may 
render an advisory opinion. See Phillip M. Kannan, Advisory Opinions by Federal Courts, 32 U. 
RICH. L. REV. 769, 771 (1998). Where a plaintiff simply asserts “generalized assertions that 
they will be ‘adversely affected’” by the defendant’s actions, such that the court is “left to 
speculate as to the nature of the claim” that the plaintiff is making and is left with nothing 
more than a hypothetical claim and “abstraction,” the court’s ruling would be nothing more 
than an advisory opinion. Nat’l Council for Improved Health v. Shalala, 122 F.3d 878, 883–
84 (10th Cir. 1997). If global warming plaintiffs meet the requirements of constitutional 
standing, they will bring a concrete, actual claim that is fit for adjudication that will not result 
in an advisory opinion. On this particular element of the analysis, however, if the court does 
not restrict the parties to alleging an injury that “is at least imminent,” then the court may 
likely engage in unconstitutional conduct by rendering an advisory opinion, “deciding a case in 
which no injury would have occurred at all.” Fla. Audubon Soc’y v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658, 663 
(D.C. Cir. 1996) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564 n.2). Thus, the “imminent” nature of a 
claim does not necessarily lead a court to render an advisory opinion, but only when that claim 
falls in to the category of speculation. The inadequacy of the science and models prevent global 
warming plaintiffs from keeping their injury claim out of the hypothetical and speculative 
classification.  
 150. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564 n.2. 
Although “imminence” is concededly a somewhat elastic concept, it cannot be 
stretched beyond its purpose, which is to ensure that the alleged injury is not too 
speculative for Article III purposes—that the injury is “certainly impending.” It has 
been stretched beyond the breaking point when . . . the plaintiff alleges only an 
injury at some indefinite future time, and the acts necessary to make the injury 
happen are at least partly within the plaintiff’s own control. 
Id. 
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Circuit Court of Appeals recently recognized a distinction between 
injuries that “fit easily within or without the common definition” of 
“imminent” and those that do not.151 The Court concluded that 
“among those that fit least well are purely probabilistic injuries.”152 
Global warming injuries epitomize “probabilistic injuries.” It is true 
that the Supreme Court has recognized that “threatened injuries can 
give rise to standing,”153 however, “‘well-established’ precedent 
requires that the injury alleged be ‘substantially probable.’”154 The 
Supreme Court has ratified this standard of “substantial 
probability”155 and has spoken of requiring the plaintiff to 
“demonstrate a realistic danger of sustaining a direct injury as a 
result” of the defendant’s action.156 The entire purpose underlying 
Lujan’s requirement of showing an imminent injury was to ensure 
that the claim was “not too speculative for Article III purposes.”157
Global warming plaintiffs cannot take their imminent injury 
claims out of the speculative category, because their claims are based 
entirely on conjectural, complex systems of climate modeling. 
Models and various other methods of predicting future atmospheric 
conditions are central to determining whether a certain event will be 
produced by global warming.  
But how sure can climate scientists be about the projections 
produced by their models? In a recent paper by an anthropologist 
who studied several years at the National Center for Atmospheric 
Research, she admitted that even climate modelers may be uncertain 
 151. Nat’l Res. Def. Council v. EPA, No. 04-1438, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 5701, at *15 
(D.C. Cir. 2006). 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. (quoting Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church 
and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982)). 
 154. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 5701, at *15 (quoting Fla. 
Audubon Soc’y, 94 F.3d at 663). 
 155. Id. (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 504 (1975)). 
 156. Id. (quoting Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat’l Union, 422 U.S. 289, 298 
(1979)). In Friends of the Earth v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., the Fourth Circuit held that 
the threat of injury alone posed by the defendant’s discharges was sufficient to satisfy standing: 
“The Supreme Court has consistently recognized that threatened rather than actual injury can 
satisfy Article III standing requirements.” 204 F.3d 149, 160 (4th Cir. 2000); see also 
Mountain States Legal Found. v. Glickman, 92 F.3d 1228, 1232–36 (D.C. Cir. 1996) 
(finding that an increased risk of wildfire from certain logging practices constitutes injury-in-
fact). 
 157. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 564 n.2 (1992). 
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about their findings.158 She actually quoted one climate modeler as 
stating, “It is easy to get caught up in it; you start to believe that 
what happens in your model must be what happens in the real world. 
And often that is not true.”159 Some scientists argue that the 
standard climate models upon which plaintiffs’ claims would be 
based assume that carbon dioxide concentration follows a perfectly 
linear growth rate of one percent per year, yet studies show the 
actual growth rate over the last fifteen years to be about 0.58 
percent.160 The use of such an exaggerated figure demonstrates that 
the models may ignore reality and “run way too fast, predicting 
warming coming almost twice as fast . . . or predicting much more 
warming in a given time.”161 Even some members of Congress are 
questioning notable data that concludes that there has been a sharp 
rise in the earth’s temperatures in recent years in comparison with 
past ages.162 Moreover, models do not take into account the impact 
of future legislative or regulatory action that may produce more 
stringent requirements for efficiency standards, or scientific 
breakthroughs that may facilitate emission reductions.163 Models do 
not adequately account for alternative sources of energy and lower 
prices in renewable energy, which will likely be substituted for fossil 
fuels.164
In National Resources Defense Council v. EPA, the D.C. Circuit 
Court of Appeals denied plaintiffs standing because they failed to 
show an imminent injury-in-fact from the increased emission of 
 158. See Holman W. Jenkins, Jr., A Global Warming Worksheet, WALL ST. J., Feb. 1, 
2006, at A15. 
 159. Id. 
 160. LOMBORG, supra note 72, at 279. The computer simulations used for climate 
change typically translate the impact from other greenhouse gases into carbon dioxide in order 
to simplify the data. If one were to look at the actual growth of carbon dioxide alone per year, 
one would see that its concentration grew by 0.43 percent per year in the 1990s. Id. Also, 
some scientists claim that the prediction scenarios formulated by the IPCC contemplate a 
larger reduction in sulfur dioxide than is realistic, which is important “because sulfur aerosols 
cool the climate” and reduce the impact of warming. Id. at 279–80. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Antonio Regalado, Academy to Referee Climate-Change Fight, WALL ST. J., Feb. 10, 
2006, at B4. The notable research is a chart called the “hockey stick.” Id. Congress has asked 
the National Academy of Sciences to assess the accuracy of the representations of the chart. Id. 
 163. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, U.S. CLIMATE ACTION REP. ch. 5, at 79–80 (May 2002), 
available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/oar/globalwarming.nsf/UniqueKeyLookup/SHSU5B 
NQ76/$File/ch5.pdf. 
 164. LOMBORG, supra note 72, at 286. 
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ozone-depleting substances.165 Similar to what plaintiffs will have to 
do in global warming cases, the plaintiffs relied on various models 
predicting the future impact of the harmful emissions on human 
health and the environment.166 The court refused to give credence to 
these models, noting some of the same flaws that exist in the global 
warming models. For example, the models were based on figures of 
the United States alone and failed to take into account global 
contributions to the alleged injuries, the models predicted health 
outcomes over a 145-year period, and the models assumed a 
perfectly linear relationship between the harmful substance and the 
adverse health effects.167 These modeling flaws are the same flaws 
that exist in global warming models, and in this case, the court 
concluded that such flaws prevented it from holding that the alleged 
adverse effects were imminent. 
The science and the models fail to provide the adequate level of 
certainty that a defendant’s emissions will injure a plaintiff in the 
imminent future. If the plaintiffs’ allegations are to be construed as 
meaning nothing more than they will suffer injury “‘in this 
lifetime,’” a granting of standing will be an abuse of the “elastic 
concept” of imminence, stretching it “beyond its purpose,” and 
leading courts to render nothing more than “an advisory opinion in 
‘a case in which no injury w[ill] . . . occur[] at all.’”168  
In sum, global warming plaintiffs will not succeed in proving 
injury-in-fact. Whether they allege an actual or imminent injury, they 
cannot show that global warming, the result of the defendant’s 
emissions, resulted in the natural event causing their alleged injury. 
Moreover, if plaintiffs allege a future injury, they will face an 
additional obstacle of proving that their injury will occur in the 
imminent future, a standard that they will not be able to meet due to 
the conjectural, uncertain nature of the climate modeling and 
science. 
 165. No. 04-1438, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 5701, at *20 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
 166. Id. at *12–13. 
 167. Id. at *13–14. 
 168. Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Espy, 23 F.3d 496, 500 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (citations 
omitted).
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Although the Court in Lujan and Laidlaw did not analyze 
causation for purposes of its holding, the Court made it clear that a 
plaintiff is required to demonstrate that his concrete, particularized 
injury, whether actual or imminent, is fairly traceable to the acts of 
the defendant.169 Causation demands a link between the plaintiff’s 
injury and the defendant’s allegedly harmful conduct170—its 
greenhouse gas emissions. Global warming plaintiffs will fail to prove 
causation because the causal chain between their injuries and the 
emissions of a particular defendant is too attenuated by the multiple 
alternative factors that could be the source of the global warming. 171 
As a result, they will not be able to satisfy the necessary legal 
standard of certainty, which requires the plaintiff to prove with a 
“substantial likelihood” that her injury resulted from the defendant’s 
carbon emissions and not some independent factor.172 In other 
words, the plaintiff must show there is a substantial likelihood that if 
a particular entity’s carbon emissions were reduced, or even 
eliminated entirely, their injury would not have occurred.173
The ultimate problem in global warming suits is that “[t]he 
climate is a vast, complex and poorly understood system.”174 The 
causal chain begins with the defendant emitting greenhouse gases, 
but “there is considerable uncertainty in current understanding of 
how the climate system reacts . . . to emissions of greenhouse 
gases.”175 Tremendous uncertainty remains with respect to the role 
of natural variability in comparison to human influence in global 
warming.176 There are multiple natural and artificial factors that 
could be the ultimate cause of the global warming that produced the 
natural disaster. These factors may act as supervening factors in the 
 169. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). 
 170. Friends of the Earth v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d 149, 161 (4th 
Cir. 2000). 
 171. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 
26, 41–42 (1976)).
 172. Pub. Interest Group of N.J., Inc. v. Powell Duffryn Terminals, Inc., 913 F.2d 64, 
72 (3d Cir. 1990) (citation omitted).
 173. Id. at 68. 
 174. Jenkins, supra note 158, at A15. 
 175. LaRochelle & Spencer, supra note 136, at 5. 
 176. Id. 
3BERTAGNA.FIN.DOC 5/12/2006 10:51:07 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2006 
448 
 
chain of causation.177 It is possible that the defendant’s emissions 
contributed to warmer temperatures, but it is also possible that the 
effects of farming on the environment were a more substantial factor 
in producing the necessary atmospheric conditions that produced the 
injury.178 It is possible that the defendant’s emissions influenced 
temperatures, but it is also feasible that the impact of a city’s 
pavement and buildings was the significant factor in producing the 
necessary temperature rise.179 It is possible that solar activity was the 
cause of the warmer temperatures.180 It is plausible that warmer 
temperatures were not a product of an increase in carbon dioxide, 
but rather a product of water vapor—“water vapor is a far more 
powerful greenhouse gas than carbon dioxide.”181 
Chlorofluorocarbons and other greenhouse gases, such as methane, 
may contribute to global warming.182 In fact, CFCs “trap over ten 
thousand . . . times more thermal radiation than does carbon 
dioxide.”183 Even if carbon dioxide emissions were the source of the 
hurricane or forest fire, the source of those emissions may not have 
 177. This Comment disagrees with a law review piece authored by David Grossman. 
Grossman argues that “the studies and models of the IPCC relied upon provide a solid basis 
for arguing that a general causal link exists between greenhouse gas emissions, climate change, 
and effects such as sea-level rise, thawing permafrost, and melting sea ice.” David A. Grossman, 
Warming Up to a Not-So-Radical Idea: Tort–Based Climate Change Litigation, 28 COLUM. J. 
ENVTL. L. 1, 22–23. According to Grossman, the causal chain is not too attenuated to show 
causation and to show that the companies that produce greenhouse gases do not lack control 
of the means by which these gases are produced. Id. at 27. This author agrees that Grossman’s 
argument could hold up if science could conclusively prove that global warming actually 
caused floods, sea-level rise, or other natural calamities. However, this author does not believe 
that current science can support such a conclusion. For more discussion of the inadequacies of 
science in this area, see supra Part III. 
 178. See Sallie Baliunas, Full of Hot Air: A Climate Alarmist Takes on “Criminals Against 
Humanity,” REASON, Oct. 2005, at 64. 
 179. Id. 
 180. See LOMBORG, supra note 72, at 276. “[S]olar brightness has increased about 0.4 
percent over the past 200–300 years, causing an increase of about 0.4°C . . . and the trend 
over the last decades is equivalent to another 0.4°C to 2100.” Id. 
 181. Guterl, supra note 95, at 44 (quoting Richard Lindzen). Lindzen claims that a 
slight change in the amount of water vapor in the atmosphere “could wipe out, or amplify, the 
effects of a rise in carbon dioxide.” Id. 
 182. Lauren Etter, Editorial, Global Warming: A Cloudy Outlook, WALL ST. J., Dec. 10, 
2005, at A10. The United States’ one hundred million cattle emit 5.5 million metric tons of 
methane a year, accounting for almost twenty percent of human-related methane emissions. Id. 
 183. Woodward, supra note 138, at 211. 
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been industrial. In 2003, more carbon dioxide was emitted by 
transportation sources than by industrial sources.184  
The science does not permit a court to conclude that a particular 
defendant’s carbon emissions were the cause of a global warming 
plaintiff’s injury. History provides poignant examples of people 
attributing the effect to the wrong cause.185 The hurricane or flood 
that produced the plaintiff’s injury could be the effect of many 
different sources, one of which may be the defendant’s carbon 
emissions. But the court certainly cannot conclude that there is a 
substantial likelihood or a good probability that those emissions were 
the definitive cause of the environmental disaster. Such a claim is not 
“ripe for adjudication” because it is “contingent on a number of 
factors” and is “too speculative.”186
In some environmental pollution cases, especially Clean Water 
Act cases, courts will treat the plaintiff located in the emission “zone 
of a polluter” differently from the plaintiff who is so far removed 
from the polluter that her “injuries cannot fairly be traced to that” 
polluter.187 Such a requirement of geographic proximity is consistent 
with the finding of the Court in Lujan, which rejected the nexus 
theories188 and denied the contention that distance does not prevent 
an injury.189 This requirement would seem to argue against the 
success of global warming plaintiffs in proving causation because the 
individual may bring a suit against a defendant’s contribution to 
global warming, the source of which is located thousands of miles 
away. For example, one of the plaintiffs in Watson alleged that the 
defendant’s greenhouse emissions caused an outbreak of the spruce 
 184. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,  U.S. EMISSIONS INVENTORY 2005 (EPA 430-R-5-003) 
(April 2005), available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/oar/globalwarming.nsf/content/ 
ResourceCenterPublicationsGHGEmissionsUSEmissionsInventory2005.html. Industrial 
sources accounted for twenty-eight percent of carbon dioxide produced from fossil fuel 
combustion in 2003, but transportation sources produced thirty-two percent. Id. The 
remainder of carbon dioxide emissions was a result of commercial and residential sources. Id. 
 185. David Doniger, Global Warming, Emissions and Kyoto, WALL ST. J., Jan. 31, 2006, 
at A15. The author of the article gives several examples of attributing a natural phenomenon to 
the wrong cause: the nature of electric current to fluid flow, the cause of malaria to bad air, the 
Black Death to alignment of the planets, and cancer to a virus. Id.  
 186. Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296, 300–01 (1998).  
 187. Tex. Indep. Producers & Royalty Owners Ass’n v. EPA, 410 F.3d 964, 973 (7th 
Cir. 2004) (quoting Friends of the Earth v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d 149, 
162 (4th Cir. 2000)). 
 188. See supra notes 45–47 and accompanying text. 
 189. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 584 U.S. 555, 567 n.3 (1992).  
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bark beetle, which had destroyed forests in her home of 
Anchorage.190 The problem is that the projects that she claimed were 
contributing to the beetle outbreak were in, among other places, 
Chad, Venezuela, and Indonesia.191
The zone of the polluter test, however, seems to be inapplicable 
in global warming suits. Where the polluter is discharging a toxin 
into a river, only those people within a reasonable range of the 
original discharge point will be affected by the discharge. A person in 
New Mexico will not be affected by a discharge of mercury into a 
river in Georgia. However, it is reasonable to say that a project that 
emits substantial amounts of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere in 
Venezuela contributes to the overall warming of the earth’s 
atmosphere, which may affect a person living in California. In other 
words, it is arguable that the zone of the polluter of greenhouse 
gases is global. Moreover, a plaintiff does not need to show that the 
defendant’s carbon dioxide emissions alone caused the harm.192  
While a lack of geographic proximity will not likely impede 
plaintiffs from filing actions for carbon emissions in distant locations, 
the science is still not sufficiently determinative to allow courts to 
decide that it was the actions of a particular party rather than those 
of an independent third party that are the cause of plaintiffs’ injuries. 
Neither Congress nor the Supreme Court intended the causation 
factor to be a rigorous scientific examination, but at the bare 
minimum, in order to bring suit, the plaintiff must establish that he 
is “adversely affected” by the defendant’s action.193 Presently, the 
science is such that a plaintiff cannot demonstrate a “substantial 
likelihood” that a factory’s carbon emissions, a routine consequence 
of industrial operations, are adversely affecting (or will adversely 
affect) a plaintiff’s concrete, particularized interest. No regulation or 
 190. Declaration of Melanie Duchin at 2, Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Watson, No. C 
02–4106 (JSW), 2005 WL 2035596 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2005). 
 191. Watson, 2005 WL 2035596, at *2; see also Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive 
Relief (Second Amended) at 39–45, Watson, 2005 WL 2035596, available at 
http://www.climatelawsuit.org/documents/Complaint_2Amended_Declr_Inj_Relief.pdf. 
 192. Pub. Interest Group of N.J., Inc. v. Powell Duffryn Terminals, Inc., 913 F.2d 64, 
72 (3d Cir. 1990); see also Gaston Copper, 204 F.3d at 162. 
 193. Gaston Copper, 204 F.3d at 162. Assuming that a court did determine that plaintiffs 
had shown that the defendant’s emissions were a cause of the plaintiff’s injuries, it would have 
an additional burden of establishing how to allocate liability of the multiple sources of the 
injury. This question of liability is not part of standing analysis and is beyond the scope of this 
Comment. 
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legislation has been enacted that allows one to objectively qualify a 
company’s carbon emissions as harmful, wrongful, or negligent, and 
there are too many factors in the causal chain to trace the harm back 
to the defendant’s carbon emissions.  
C. Redressability 
Lujan and Laidlaw both included redressability as an essential 
component of the standing analysis. This requirement consists of 
determining whether a favorable decision by a court would likely 
redress the plaintiffs’ injuries.194 Even if a plaintiff proves to the court 
that the defendant caused or will cause her injury, the court will not 
expend its resources in adjudicating her claim unless the court can 
deliver a judgment that would personally benefit her “in a tangible 
way.”195 Global warming plaintiffs generally will have no problem 
showing redressability.  
With respect to redressability, this Section assumes that a court 
has accepted that the injury-in-fact and causation prongs of analysis 
have been satisfied. Certainly, if a court followed the arguments 
already proposed by this Comment and refused to find the science 
sufficiently conclusive as to make a finding of injury-in-fact or 
causation, then redressability would be a moot issue. Assuming this 
fact, the plaintiff need only show that it is “likely, as opposed to 
merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable 
decision.”196 For example, legal damages would likely redress New 
Orleans residents who lost their homes, cars, and businesses in 
Katrina, providing them the value of what they had lost. An 
injunction would likely redress a New Orleans resident who is 
alleging that a company’s emissions pose a threat of another 
hurricane. The injunction would terminate, or at least reduce, the 
defendant’s emissions, diminishing future contributions to global 
warming and to the possibility of a future hurricane. This would be 
especially true in the case of a suit against a number of companies 
whose emissions comprise a substantial portion of an industry’s 
emissions. At the bare minimum, an injunction would likely 
 194. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. 
 195. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 508 (1975). A plaintiff must show that “the 
practical consequence” of a favorable decision would result in “a significant increase in the 
likelihood that the plaintiff would obtain relief that directly redresses the injury suffered.” Utah 
v. Evans, 536 U.S. 452, 464 (2002). 
 196.  Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 181 (2000).  
3BERTAGNA.FIN.DOC 5/12/2006 10:51:07 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2006 
452 
 
“materially reduce their reasonable concerns about those 
endangerments” caused by the company’s greenhouse gas 
emissions.197 Civil penalties would likely bring redress as well because 
the penalties would deter future harmful emissions, reducing its 
likelihood of contributing to the adverse conditions that lead to the 
development of a hurricane.198 According to the broad language of 
Laidlaw, any “sanction that effectively abates” a particular conduct 
“and prevents its recurrence provides a form of redress.”199 
Injunctive or other equitable relief would likely assist in the 
abatement of future greenhouse gas emissions and consequently 
global warming.  
D. Prudential Standing 
Once the plaintiff in a global warming suit has established the 
foregoing elements—injury-in-fact, causation, and redressability—he 
has established constitutional standing. While this Comment has 
argued that the chances of demonstrating constitutional standing 
are, at best, remote, a global warming plaintiff has yet another 
standing barrier to overcome before a court will hear his claim: he 
must prove that he has prudential standing.200  
Congress has the authority to confer standing on a party through 
legislation. Congress has conferred such authority upon 
environmental plaintiffs through citizen suit provisions found in 
federal statutes such as the CAA and CWA. The basic idea 
underlying prudential standing is that “in the exercise of ‘prudence,’ 
the Court may decline to grant standing to a plaintiff, but if 
Congress explicitly confers standing on such a plaintiff, then the 
Court’s ‘prudential’ hesitation is overcome.”201 Thus, a court 
typically invokes prudential standing to determine whether a plaintiff 
has the right to seek a particular claim “in the absence of a clear 
 197. Interfaith Cmty. Org. v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 399 F.3d 248, 257 (3d Cir. 2005). 
 198. See Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 186. 
 199. Id. at 185–86. Justice Scalia found the Court’s treatment of redressability to be just 
as “cavalier” as its treatment of injury-in-fact. Id. at 202 (Scalia, J., dissenting). He emphasized 
that the purpose of “remediation” is to extend “relief specifically tailored to the plaintiff’s 
injury, and not any sort of relief that has some incidental benefit to the plaintiff.” Id. at 204. 
 200. Joint Stock Soc’y v. UDV N. Am., Inc., 266 F.3d 164, 175 (3d Cir. 2001) 
(“Constitutional standing is a threshold issue that we should address before examining issues 
of prudential standing and statutory interpretation.”). 
 201. Fletcher, supra note 25, at 252. 
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statutory directive.”202 The Supreme Court has never clearly defined 
the actual dimensions of prudential standing; however, it has 
explained that this analysis encompasses several limitations. 
Considering the pattern by federal courts in interpreting one of these 
specific limitations as part of their prudential standing analysis, this 
Comment only focuses on whether the plaintiff’s complaint falls 
within the zone of interests protected by the law invoked.203 
Additionally, it must be noted that the zone-of-interest test does not 
apply to common law actions, such as nuisance. This prudential 
inquiry “is an issue of statutory standing” only.204
For most courts, the “key inquiry” of prudential standing is 
whether the plaintiff’s injury is “arguably within the zone of interests 
to be protected” by the statute, or in the case of common law, the 
zone of interests designed to be protected by a common law theory 
under which the plaintiff brings her claim.205 The plaintiff must show 
that her injury—an injury from global warming—is the kind of injury 
that a statute or a common law theory of recovery is intended to 
address.206 Prudential standing is not intended to be a rigorous 
standard for global warming plaintiffs to satisfy.207 It excludes only 
those interests that “are so marginally related to or inconsistent with 
the purposes implicit” in a statute or the common law “that it 
cannot reasonably be assumed” that the particular law or theory of 
recovery was “intended to permit the suit.”208
 202. Id. 
 203. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11 (2004).  
 204. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 97 (1998). The following 
statement elaborates upon the inapplicability of the zone-of-interest test with respect to 
common law claims: 
The zone of interests test applies only when a complainant must invoke a statute to 
protect an injured interest. Common law rights, however, are legal interests that do 
not require a statute for judicial protection. Complainants seeking redress for an 
injury to an interest protected at common law need only adequately allege that 
interest, and a court will know that a protectable interest is involved. Therefore, the 
zone of interests test has no effect on the courts’ ability to protect common law 
rights when applied in proper contexts. 
Sanford A. Church, A Defense of the “Zone of Interests” Standing Test, 1983 DUKE L.J. 447, 461. 
 205. See Nat’l Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass’n v. Pine Belt Reg’l Solid Waste, 389 F.3d 491, 
499 (quoting Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970)). 
 206.  See Fed. Election Comm’n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 20 (1998). 
 207. See Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Ass’n, 479 U.S. 388, 399 (1987). 
 208. Id. 
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Given that the Clean Air Act regulates the pollution of the 
earth’s atmosphere, this statute is the most likely candidate for global 
warming plaintiffs to seek statutory relief for their injuries. Normally, 
the plaintiff claims harm from a gas that is regulated by the CAA, 
and in such a case, prudential standing is not an issue because of the 
citizen suit provision authorizing the action.209 The problem in the 
context of global warming suits is that the CAA does not expressly 
regulate greenhouse gases, and it is not clear that Congress intended 
to protect interests injured by global warming. In 2003, the EPA’s 
General Counsel, Robert Fabricant, wrote a memorandum to the 
EPA Administrator in which Fabricant concluded, after analyzing the 
CAA and other relevant materials, that the CAA “does not authorize 
regulation to address global climate change.”210 In Massachusetts v. 
EPA, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals noted that the EPA 
Administrator largely adopted Fabricant’s position in denying the 
petition that was on appeal before the court in that case.211 The court 
upheld the ruling of the EPA Administrator.212
However, if the court interprets the statute’s zone of interests 
broadly and adopts a particular side of the global warming debate, 
then global warming plaintiffs may be granted prudential standing. If 
the court interprets this test as requiring it “to secure the benefits 
of” the CAA “for the groups that Congress intended to benefit,” it 
is possible that the court will grant prudential standing to the 
plaintiffs.213 What are the benefits to be secured by the CAA? The 
overriding purpose of the CAA is to “protect and enhance the 
quality of the Nation’s air resources so as to promote the public 
health and welfare and the productive capacity of its population.”214 
If the court is partial to the science concluding that global warming 
is adversely affecting the quality of the nation’s air and endangering 
public welfare, a court may assume that Congress intended to permit 
 209. See Covington v. Jefferson County, 358 F.3d 626, 638 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding 
where plaintiff claimed injury from release of CFCs, there was no prudential standing issue 
because Congress had authorized citizen suits for violations of the CAA). 
 210. Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50, 54 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Leaf Tobacco Exporters Ass’n v. Block, 749 F.2d 1106, 1111 (4th Cir. 1984). 
 214. 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1) (2000). 
3BERTAGNA.FIN.DOC 5/12/2006 10:51:07 AM 
415] “Standing” Up for the Environment 
 455 
 
the plaintiff’s global warming action because the suit would 
“advance, rather than hinder,” the stated objectives of the CAA.215
E. The Outcome 
Plaintiffs in global warming suits will likely fail to prove that they 
have legal standing to have a federal court adjudicate their injury 
claims. First, they will fail to prove injury-in-fact, actual or imminent, 
because the lack of scientific and legal foundation deprives courts of 
the ability to conclude that global warming is the likely source of the 
alleged injury. Second, the inherently speculative nature of climate 
modeling will not allow plaintiffs to prove there is a substantial 
probability that a future injury from global warming will occur 
imminently. Third, the current uncertainty of the science and various 
factors contributing to global warming preclude plaintiffs from 
 215. Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v. EPA, 374 F.3d 1363, 1370 (D.C. Cir. 2004). Another 
judicially-created limitation on the jurisdiction of federal courts is embodied in the political 
question doctrine. In re African-American Slave Descendants Litig., 375 F. Supp. 2d 721, 754 
(N.D. Ill. 2005). The political question doctrine is invoked where a plaintiff brings a matter 
that is more appropriate for legislative rather than judicial resolution. The history of this 
limitation reaches all the way back to Marbury v. Madison, in which Chief Justice Marshall 
declared that questions that are political in nature are not fit for judicial determination. 5 U.S. 
137, 170 (1803). The notion is that the presence of a political question should cause a court 
to “refrain from adjudicating the issue to prevent unwarranted interference with decisions 
properly made by the Representative Branches of the federal government.” African-American 
Slave Descendants, 375 F. Supp. 2d at 755. This limitation has particular relevance to global 
warming suits, which implicate issues touching upon “so many areas of national and 
international policy.” Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., No. 04 Civ. 5669(LAP), 2005 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19964, at *21 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2005). In American Electric Power, the 
plaintiffs brought a public nuisance action against the five largest emitters of carbon dioxide in 
the United States, alleging that they accounted for approximately one quarter of the U.S. 
electric power sector’s carbon dioxide emissions. Id. at *7. The federal district judge 
determined that the plaintiffs’ claims for injuries caused by the defendants’ contributions to 
global warming did not fall within the “proper domain of judges” and their claims constituted 
“a non-justiciable political question.” Id. at *5, *17–18. The judge highlighted a number of 
actions that would be required of the court to grant the relief sought by the plaintiffs: the 
court would have to determine the maximum amount of carbon dioxide that could be emitted 
by the defendants, the amount by which the defendants would have to reduce their emissions, 
the most effective way of implementing the reductions, the availability of alternative sources of 
energy, and the effect of such changes on the United States’ negotiations with other countries 
on climate change. Id. at *21–22. Considering that “virtually every sector of the U.S. economy 
is either directly or indirectly a source of greenhouse gas emissions,” the court determined that 
a decision on such a policy-laden matter required a “single-voiced statement” by the 
government. Id. at *24–25, *27. Thus, even if global warming plaintiffs were capable of 
satisfying the requirements of legal standing, a court could still refuse to adjudicate their claims 
on the basis that the courtroom is not the appropriate forum for such claims to be resolved. 
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showing a substantial likelihood that the defendant’s emissions can 
be traced to the injury. Although redressability will not likely pose a 
problem for plaintiffs, they may fail to satisfy prudential standing 
where they file a claim pursuant to a federal statute. This will depend 
on the particular court’s interpretation regarding the intended scope 
of interests to be protected by the statute. 
V. LEGAL STANDING, GLOBAL WARMING, 
AND PROCEDURAL INJURY 
Plaintiffs in global warming suits will fail to prove legal standing 
where they allege that they have suffered a substantive injury from an 
entity’s contributions to global warming; however, they may succeed 
where they instead allege a procedural injury. A procedural injury 
occurs where a statute mandates that certain procedures be followed 
“to ensure that the environmental consequences of a project are 
adequately evaluated” and where the acting agency fails to comply.216 
For example, in Lujan, the subject of the action was the Endangered 
Species Act, which requires agencies to follow a mandated 
consultative procedure: before a federal agency finances, authorizes, 
or pursues an action that may endanger a threatened species or its 
habitat, that agency must first consult with the Secretary of Interior 
to prevent or mitigate any such damage from occurring.217 Thus, the 
statute creates a procedural right in private citizens to interagency 
consultation, authorizing them to bring an action against the 
government where it fails to perform the requisite consultation. 218
Part IV of this Comment reviewed the ability of plaintiffs to 
prove legal standing in global warming suits where they have alleged 
a substantive injury, rather than a procedural injury. A substantive 
injury consists of an injury that is not tied to the consequences of a 
government entity’s failure to comply with required procedures.219 
For example, the plaintiff in Korsinsky v. EPA filed an action against 
 216. Friends of the Earth v. U.S. Navy, 841 F.2d 927, 931 (9th Cir. 1988). A procedural 
right is “the right to have the Executive observe procedures mandated by law.” Hodges v. 
Abraham, 300 F.3d 432, 444 (4th Cir. 2002). 
 217. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2000); see also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 
555, 558 (1992). 
 218. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 571–72. 
 219. Randall S. Abate & Michael J. Myers, Broadening the Scope of Environmental 
Standing: Procedural and Informational Injury-in-Fact After Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 
12 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 345, 346 (1994). 
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the defendants, claiming that their carbon dioxide emissions had 
caused his mental sickness and enhanced vulnerability to certain 
diseases—there were no procedural requirements with which the 
defendants had failed to comply.220
Although the two kinds of injury differ in their character, courts 
apply the same standing analysis to both. A plaintiff’s allegation of a 
procedural injury may have more success than that of a substantive 
injury because of the “special” nature of a procedural injury.221 In 
Lujan, Justice Scalia articulated in a footnote what has come to be 
called, at least in the Ninth Circuit, “footnote seven standing.”222 
Justice Scalia stated that when a plaintiff is alleging a violation of a 
procedural right that a statute accords him, he “can assert that right 
without meeting all the normal standards for redressability and 
immediacy.”223 In other words, a procedural injury “relaxes” the 
normal standards of standing.224
One disadvantage of seeking relief for a procedural injury is the 
resulting limitation in the remedies available. If the plaintiff claims a 
procedural injury, he will not be able to seek legal damages for his 
own injuries. Under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 
for example, the standard remedy will be to vacate the agency’s 
uninformed decision to conduct a project without the proper 
environmental analysis and to enjoin the project until the NEPA 
requirements are met.225 Plaintiffs can seek harsher penalties against 
defendants for their procedural violations under substantive 
environmental statutes. For example, a plaintiff could allege an injury 
from the defendant’s failure to adhere to the procedural 
requirements of the Clean Air Act, pursuant to which a court could 
grant a broad range of civil and criminal penalties for violations of its 
provisions.226
This Part evaluates what plaintiffs will have to prove in order to 
satisfy the three elements of constitutional standing—injury-in-fact, 
 220. No. 05 Civ. 859 (NRB), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21778 (S.D.N.Y Sept. 29, 2005). 
 221. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7.
 222. Pac. Nw. Generating Coop. v. Brown, 38 F.3d 1058, 1065 (9th Cir. 1994); see 
also Bennett v. Plenert, 63 F.3d 915, 917 n.1 (9th Cir. 1995); Idaho Farm Bureau Fed’n v. 
Babbitt, 900 F. Supp. 1349, 1361 (D. Idaho 1995). 
 223. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7.
 224. See Cantrell v. Long Beach, 241 F.3d 674, 682 (9th Cir. 2001).  
 225. See Susannah T. French, Judicial Review of the Administrative Record in NEPA 
Litigation, 81 CAL. L. REV. 929, 967 (1993). 
 226. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c) (2000). 
3BERTAGNA.FIN.DOC 5/12/2006 10:51:07 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2006 
458 
 
causation, and redressability—and prudential standing in the context 
of a procedural injury. This Part argues that the most likely avenue 
for global warming plaintiffs to have a federal court hear their claims 
is by alleging a procedural injury, because plaintiffs do not have the 
burden of proving that a future injury is imminent and the causation 
standard is relaxed. The most likely procedural statute to be invoked 
by global warming plaintiffs in these suits is the National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) because of its universal 
requirement that a federal agency follow certain mandated 
procedures before it proceeds with any project that may significantly 
affect the environment.227 Under NEPA, plaintiffs are likely to allege 
the “archetypal procedural injury”—an agency’s failure to prepare an 
environmental impact statement (EIS) before taking action with 
potentially adverse environmental effects.228
A. Injury-in-Fact 
 This prong of the analysis is the most important part of the 
plaintiff’s burden because it is the court’s “normal focus of standing 
analysis” in procedural rights cases.229 Global warming plaintiffs 
claiming a procedural injury are more likely to satisfy the injury-in-
 227. The concept of a procedural injury is rooted in NEPA. See Abate & Myers, supra 
note 219, at 354. NEPA is a procedural statute, meaning that it guarantees a particular 
procedure, not a particular result. See Ohio Forestry Ass’n v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726, 737 
(1998). It grants “relief in the form of directives to follow mandated procedures.” Abate & 
Myers, supra note 219, at 356. The principal procedure of NEPA requires federal agencies to 
prepare a report called a comprehensive environmental impact statement (EIS) before they 
pursue any action which may “significantly affect[] the quality of the human environment.” 42 
U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2000). Although plaintiffs initially brought procedural injury claims 
pursuant to procedural statutes, such as NEPA, they eventually began filing procedural injury 
claims under substantive environmental statutes as well. See Abate & Myers, supra note 219, at 
356. Substantive environmental statutes resemble procedural statutes in that they both are 
centered on environmental protection; however, substantive statutes offer more substantive 
remedies, “such as monetary damages or injunctions against environmentally destructive 
practices.” Id. For example, the Clean Air Act is a substantive environmental statute, which 
requires, among other things, federal agencies to conduct environmental evaluations prior to 
promulgating regulations under the act. Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp. 316 F.3d 1002, 
1015 (9th Cir. 2002). If the agency fails to perform the requisite analysis, plaintiffs may file a 
procedural injury claim pursuant to the CAA. Id. Essentially, as long as a statute mandates that 
an agency formally conduct an evaluation of environmental impacts of a proposed action 
before pursing it, a procedural harm may be asserted pursuant to the statute. 
 228. Nat’l Parks Conservation Ass’n v. Manson, 414 F.3d 1, 5 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
 229. Fla. Audubon Soc’y v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658, 669; see also Hodges v. Abraham, 300 
F.3d 432, 444 (4th Cir. 2002); Sierra Club v. Mainella, No. 04-2012 (JDB) 2005 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 18911, at *24 (D.D.C. Sept. 1, 2005). 
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fact prong because the relaxed standards of procedural injury remove 
the requirement of proving an imminent injury. This Section first 
discusses why one obstacle for plaintiffs in procedural injury cases—
proving the harm of global warming—remains an obstacle to 
standing. The second half of this Section discusses how the relaxed 
nature of the immediacy requirement may facilitate a grant of 
standing. 
 Asserting a procedural injury will not aid plaintiffs with respect to 
the first obstacle mentioned in Part IV regarding substantive injuries. 
An important burden that plaintiffs have under the injury-in-fact 
analysis is to demonstrate the likelihood of harm from the challenged 
action.230 The challenged action in these cases is the carbon 
emissions, but it is ultimately the result of these emissions, global 
warming, that allegedly causes the injury. Thus, a part of the injury-
in-fact analysis is showing that the injury or threat of injury has 
occurred, or will occur, as a result of global warming.231
  If plaintiffs cannot show that global warming caused the 
hurricane, or will imminently cause the hurricane, they cannot satisfy 
their burden of proving an actual or imminent injury. It does not 
matter if the defendant’s emissions contribute to global warming if 
global warming itself is not the cause of the natural event. This 
Comment has already adequately developed the argument of why 
plaintiffs cannot satisfy this burden—the science does not allow it.232 
The nature of the claim in the procedural injury context changes in 
that the plaintiff is not claiming that the injury resulted directly from 
the defendant’s emissions. Rather, the claim is that the injury 
resulted from the defendant’s uninformed decision making; by 
allowing a project to go forward, the defendant created a threat of 
imminent injury by contributing to global warming.233 However, the 
plaintiff must still show that the lack of environmental analysis 
resulted in “an increased risk of actual, threatened, or imminent 
environmental harm.”234 The same problem exists as in the 
substantive injury context: plaintiffs cannot prove that global 
warming caused the hurricane or will imminently cause a hurricane.  
 230. Comm. to Save the Rio Hondo v. Lucero, 102 F.3d 445, 451 (10th Cir. 1996). 
 231. Id. at 452; see also discussion supra Parts III, IV.A.4. 
 232. Lucero, 102 F.3d at 452. 
 233. Id.  
 234. Id. at 449. 
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This Comment has highlighted that the first obstacle is largely 
contingent on which position the particular court takes on the 
science. The remainder of this analysis will proceed assuming that a 
court accepts the science arguing that global warming is capable of 
causing a hurricane or other natural disaster. Some courts, 
particularly those in the Ninth Circuit, include a “geographic nexus” 
test as part of their injury-in-fact analysis.235 Under this test, global 
warming plaintiffs would be required to show a geographic 
proximity between their location and the location that was adversely 
affected by the defendant’s carbon emissions.236 For the same reason 
mentioned in Part III regarding the zone of the polluter analysis, this 
test poses no obstacles for global warming plaintiffs. The unique 
global nature of global warming will allow a plaintiff to establish a 
geographic nexus no matter the distance between her and the place 
suffering injury. A plaintiff in North Carolina can prove the necessary 
nexus with the defendant’s emissions in Chad because the global 
warming affects the global atmosphere, which affects the sea level 
near her home in North Carolina. 
The principal way in which the relaxed standards of procedural 
standing assist global warming plaintiffs is by allowing them to allege 
an injury that will occur in the future. The court wants to assure 
itself that it is not adjudicating a claim that will not come to fruition. 
As a result, the court requires that the plaintiff allege an injury that is 
likely to occur in the imminent future.237 This Comment has 
established that because of the conjectural nature of the science and 
climate modeling, it will be difficult for plaintiffs to prove that the 
injury, such as a hurricane, will occur in the imminent future.238 
However, if the plaintiff alleges a procedural injury, “the 
requirements of immediacy of the threatened harm are relaxed.”239 
Under this relaxed standard, it will not matter if they cannot show 
that the greenhouse gas emissions from a project permitted to move 
forward due to a failure to produce the EIS will result in imminent 
injury.240 A plaintiff will probably not be able to prove that the 
emissions of a project in Indonesia will cause the sea level to rise near 
 235. Ashley Creek Phosphate Co. v. Norton, 420 F.3d 934, 938 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 236. Id. 
 237. Wilderness Soc’y v. Griles, 824 F.2d 4, 18 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
 238. See discussion supra Part IV.A.4. 
 239. Laub v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 342 F.3d 1080, 1087 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 240. See id. 
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her house in the near future, but that consideration is irrelevant in a 
procedural injury case. In Lujan’s hypothetical scenario, the Court 
said that the plaintiff would have standing to sue even if the dam 
would not be finished “for many years.”241 This relaxed standard is 
helpful to global warming plaintiffs, who will not be able to show 
whether the hurricane or the threat of a hurricane will occur in a few 
months, years, decades, or longer. 
Therefore, in procedural injury cases, one obstacle for plaintiffs 
remains, but another is relieved. Even though plaintiffs in these 
actions are claiming injury from an agency’s failure to adequately 
assess the environmental consequences of a particular project or 
practice, they must still show that the uninformed decision making 
endangers the environment and their concrete interests. The current 
state of science does not allow them to conclusively make this 
showing. However, assuming a court does accept the science, the 
plaintiffs will no longer be burdened by having to show that the 
alleged injury will occur in the imminent future, because this 
requirement is relaxed.  
B. Causation 
Assuming a court accepts that the plaintiffs in a procedural injury 
suit have established that they will suffer a concrete, particularized 
injury-in-fact from global warming, they must then prove that it was 
specifically the defendant’s procedural violation that caused their 
injury. However, the standard to be applied by a court will vary. The 
courts have adopted two different standards in analyzing causation. 
This Section evaluates the standard adopted by the D.C. Circuit and 
Ninth Circuit, respectively. It argues that under the D.C. Circuit 
standard, plaintiffs will have the same trouble showing causation as in 
substantive injury cases because the standard is the same. Yet, 
plaintiffs have a reasonable chance at proving causation under the 
Ninth Circuit standard because of the relaxed nature of the analysis. 
The D.C. Circuit has promulgated one standard of causation 
that requires plaintiffs to show with a “substantial probability” that 
the defendant’s procedural violation caused their injury.242 The 
 241. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572 n.7 (1992). 
 242. Nat’l Parks Conservation Ass’n v. Manson, 414 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2005). One 
court has noted that the Eighth and Eleventh Circuits follow the D.C. Circuit’s approach. See 
Citizens for Better Forestry v. USDA, 341 F.3d 961, 974 (9th Cir. 2003). 
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court’s standing analysis under this approach does not change 
materially from the standard it applies for causation in normal 
substantive injury cases.243 The court is still going to look at the 
chain of causation between the agency’s procedural omission or 
deficiency and the plaintiff’s injury.244 The problem with global 
warming, as this Comment has already explained, is that this causal 
chain is too attenuated by the numerous alternative factors that may 
cause the injury for a court to grant standing.245 The court will look 
at one end of the chain and see an agency’s contributions to an 
overseas project for which no EIS was prepared. The court will then 
have to follow a long chain all the way to the other end to see the 
plaintiff’s alleged injuries. Between one end of the chain and the 
other, the court will have to consider the fate of the defendant’s 
emissions once they enter the atmosphere, “the impact of those 
emissions that remain in the atmosphere on the radiative properties 
of the atmosphere,” the influence of solar activity, the role of clouds, 
the effects of water vapor, and so on.246 Ultimately, plaintiffs cannot 
show that it was the defendant’s particular project, which went 
forward without the proper environmental assessment, that caused 
the destructive natural event. The science implicates too many 
independent factors and forces that can intervene with the chain of 
causation between the injury and the defendant’s procedural failure. 
For these reasons, procedural injury plaintiffs most likely will not 
succeed under this standard in tracing their injury to the procedural 
violation of the defendant. 
In contrast to the D.C. Circuit’s substantial probability standard 
of causation is the standard promulgated by the Ninth Circuit,247 
under which the requirements of causation are “relaxed.”248 This 
standard requires the plaintiffs to prove with a “reasonable 
probability” that the defendant’s procedural violation caused their 
 243. Nuclear Energy Inst., Inc. v. EPA, 373 F.3d 1251, 1265 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
 244. See Ctr. for Law & Educ. v. Dep’t of Educ., 396 F.3d 1152, 1158–61 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
 245. See discussion supra Part IV.B. 
 246. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50, 57 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (quoting 
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, CLIMATE CHANGE SCIENCE: AN ANALYSIS OF SOME OF THE 
KEY QUESTIONS 20 (2001)). 
 247. Citizens for Better Forestry, 341 F.3d at 974. The court noted that the Seventh 
Circuit follows the Ninth Circuit’s approach. Id. The Tenth Circuit has also adopted the Ninth 
Circuit’s approach. See Comm. to Save the Rio Hondo v. Lucero, 102 F.3d 445, 451– 52 
(10th Cir. 1996). 
 248. Laub v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 342 F.3d 1080, 1087 (9th Cir. 2003). 
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injury.249 Under this standard, the court may find causation while 
still recognizing that there were independent factors or parties that 
were necessary for the alleged injury to occur.250 The lower threshold 
of “reasonable probability” may be sufficient to find causation251 as 
long as the alleged environmental effect (global warming) has a 
“reasonably close causal relationship” to the project.252 With respect 
to procedural injury, the Court in Lujan did not seem worried with 
causation and redressability.253 Its primary concern was linking the 
procedural omission to a separate concrete interest of the plaintiffs.254 
Hence, the Ninth Circuit’s relaxed causation approach appears to be 
more consistent with Justice Scalia’s language in footnote seven of 
Lujan.255
Regardless of the test applied, the causal chain between the 
agency’s procedural violation and the plaintiff’s injury will be 
attenuated; nonetheless, a plaintiff is still more likely to succeed 
under this “lower threshold of causation”256 than under the D.C. 
Circuit’s more stringent standard. The morass of uncertainty created 
by all the conflicting science regarding the cause of global warming 
precludes a court from declaring with “substantial probability” that a 
defendant’s failure to produce an EIS will lead to carbon emissions 
producing the necessary impact on global warming that then causes 
the destructive natural event. Nevertheless, there is concomitantly a 
tremendous amount of credible evidence upon which the court 
could at least conclude that there is a “reasonable probability” that 
the defendant’s emissions will contribute to the alleged disaster. In 
sum, if the plaintiffs are before a court that applies the relaxed 
 249. Bell v. Bonneville Power Admin., 340 F.3d 945, 951 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 250. Pub. Citizen v. Dep’t of Transp., 316 F.3d 1002, 1017–18 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 251. Id. 
 252. Dep’t of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 767 (2004). 
 253. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 571–72 (1992). 
 254. Id. 
 255. One reason why the Court in Lujan and courts thereafter may have been 
comfortable with relaxing the requirements for standing in procedural injury cases is the 
unique nature of the underlying objectives of a procedural right: “A procedural right is created, 
not because it necessarily yields particular outcomes, but because it structures incentives and 
creates pressures that Congress has deemed important to effective regulation.” Cass R. 
Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and Article III, 91 MICH. 
L. REV. 163, 226 (1992). Broader leniency in allowing standing for procedural rights would 
further the objectives of procedural rights in general to provide agencies an incentive to 
effectively regulate within their respective jurisdictions. 
 256. Pub. Citizen v. Dep’t of Transp., 316 F.3d 1002, 1017–18 (9th Cir. 2002). 
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“reasonable probability” standard of causation, the court may hold 
that they have successfully proved causation. 
C. Redressability 
Unlike the diverging standards for proving causation outlined 
above, all federal courts relax the redressability requirement in 
procedural injury cases.257 As a result, procedural injury plaintiffs will 
succeed in proving redressability because courts have essentially 
removed this requirement from the standing analysis. Plaintiffs need 
not show that a favorable decision from the court will “fully 
remed[y]” them,258 that an order by the court requiring the 
defendant to perform the EIS assessing the project’s effects on global 
warming will benefit them,259 or that any further analysis of the 
impact of the project on global warming “would result in a different 
conclusion.”260 The courts’ analysis of the third requirement of 
constitutional standing in the context of procedural injury cases 
seems to conclude that this requirement is nearly nonexistent. A 
procedural injury plaintiff satisfies this requirement by showing that 
the project’s construction or operation “could be influenced” by a 
court decision requiring the defendant to evaluate the projects’ 
potential impact on global warming.261
D. Prudential Standing 
Once the procedural injury plaintiff in a global warming suit has 
established the three requirements of constitutional standing from 
Lujan, she must also establish that she has prudential standing to 
bring her claim.262 The nature of this requirement will be the same 
for plaintiffs whether they are alleging a substantive or procedural 
injury from a defendant’s contributions to global warming. The 
 257. See Colo. Envtl. Coalition v. Wenker, 353 F.3d 1221, 1240 (10th Cir. 2004). 
 258. See Pye v. United States, 269 F.3d 459, 471 (4th Cir. 2001). 
 259. See Or. Natural Desert Ass’n v. Dombeck, 172 F.3d 1092, 1094 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 260. Laub v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 342 F.3d 1080, 1087 (9th Cir. 2003). In 
footnote seven of Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, the Court wrote, “[O]ne living adjacent to 
the site for proposed construction of a federally licensed dam has standing to challenge the 
licensing agency’s failure to prepare an environmental impact statement, even though he 
cannot establish with any certainty that the statement will cause the license to be withheld or 
altered.” 504 U.S. 555, 572 n.7 (1992). 
 261. Hall v. Norton, 266 F.3d 969, 977 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 262. See Sausalito v. O’Neill, 386 F.3d 1186, 1199 (9th Cir. 2004). 
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plaintiff must show that her injury falls within the “zone of interests” 
that Congress intended to protect with the enactment of the 
statute263 in order to show the court that she is litigating her own 
rights and not those of a third party.264 This Comment has already 
established that this analysis is inapplicable to common law claims.265  
This Section will briefly examine the zone of interests associated 
with NEPA, since this is the principal statute under which global 
warming plaintiffs will probably bring their procedural injury claims. 
This Section argues that procedural injury plaintiffs will satisfy 
prudential standing with respect to NEPA as long as they are in part 
motivated by a desire to protect the environment.266
With the enactment of NEPA, Congress intended to protect 
environmental interests.267 Hence, if a plaintiff wanted to sue an 
agency for funding a project in Chad that is contributing 
substantially to global warming, the plaintiff would likely be 
motivated in part to protect the environment. If her motivation is 
purely monetary rather than environmental, most courts will hold 
that her claim does not fall within NEPA’s jurisdiction.268 Courts do 
not want private parties abusing NEPA by using it to further their 
own personal interests and not those of the environment.269 The 
 263. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 733 (1972); Hodges v. Abraham, 300 
F.3d 432, 444 (4th Cir. 2002). 
 264. Dismas Charities, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 401 F.3d 666, 674 (6th Cir. 2005). 
 265. See discussion supra Part IV.D. Moreover, the prudential standing analysis in the 
procedural injury analysis is inapplicable to common law claims because the common law does 
not stipulate procedural requirements.  
 266. The other principal statute under which global warming plaintiffs are likely to claim 
procedural injury is the Clean Air Act, which does articulate that certain procedures be 
followed. For example, in National Parks Conservation Association v. Manson, the plaintiffs 
claimed procedural injury under the CAA due to the government’s failure to adequately 
determine a proposed plant’s impact on air quality in the nearby area. 414 F.3d 1, 5 (D.C. Cir. 
2005). However, this Comment has already addressed the prudential standing issues associated 
with the CAA. See discussion supra Part IV.D. 
 267. Manson, 414 F.3d at 5. “NEPA does not authorize a private right of action,” which 
means that a plaintiff can obtain judicial review of a NEPA claim only under the Administrative 
Procedure Act (APA). Sierra Club v. Slater, 120 F.3d 623, 630–31 (6th Cir. 1997). The APA 
provides that a “person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or 
aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial 
review thereof.” 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2000). The Supreme Court has interpreted this provision of 
the APA “to impose a prudential standing requirement in addition to the requirements 
imposed by Article III of the Constitution.” Nat’l Credit Union Admin. v. First Nat’l Bank & 
Trust Co., 522 U.S. 479, 488 (1998). 
 268. Nev. Land Action Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 8 F.3d 713, 716 (9th Cir. 1993). 
 269. Stratford v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 285 F.3d 84, 88 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
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plaintiff may be motivated in part by economic interests, but she 
must still demonstrate with a “substantial probability” that she has 
nonmonetary interests that would qualify as a legally protected 
interest under NEPA.270 Therefore, prudential standing will not pose 
an obstacle for global warming plaintiffs in most cases. 
E. Outcome 
Although procedural injury plaintiffs are not guaranteed success 
in establishing legal standing in global warming suits, they can be 
assured that there chances of success are much better than when 
asserting substantive injuries. They still have a substantial obstacle in 
trying to prove that the global warming caused by the defendant’s 
emissions results in their injury. However, where the court accepts 
the science as sufficient, these plaintiffs are relieved of the difficulty 
of proving an imminent injury. If the plaintiffs are before a court that 
adopts the Ninth Circuit standard of causation, they have an 
improved chance of having the court conclude that there is a 
reasonable probability that the defendant’s procedural violation 
caused their injury. Finally, the redressability requirement is 
essentially nonexistent, and the zone-of-interest test is easily satisfied 
in most cases. These factors argue that plaintiffs have a reasonable 
chance, and definitely an improved chance, of success in proving 
standing where they allege procedural injury. 
VI. SUBSTANTIVE INJURY V. PROCEDURAL INJURY: A COMPARISON 
This Comment has explained what plaintiffs must do to establish 
legal standing in suits that seek relief for harm suffered by a 
defendant’s contributions to global warming. This Part will provide a 
hypothetical situation to illustrate the relative positions of a plaintiff, 
comparing when she alleges a substantive injury to when she alleges 
a procedural injury. The example will illustrate that global warming 
plaintiffs will fail in proving standing where they allege a substantive 
injury but have a much improved chance of doing so where they 
allege a procedural injury. 
 270. Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 417 F.3d 1272, 1287–
88 (D.C. Cir. 2005). Thus, having an economic interest does not “blight” the qualifying 
interests and as long as there is a “congruence of interests,” monetary as well as environmental, 
then standing may still be found. Id. 
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A. The Problem 
Many view the increasingly dangerous outlook for the future of 
polar bears in the Arctic to be one of most recent manifestations of 
global warming.271 Polar bears have adapted to living and hunting on 
ice sheets;272 however, the ice of the Arctic is retreating more and 
more every year, causing polar bears to swim long distances into the 
ocean to find food.273 Since polar bears are more accustomed to 
swimming shorter distances, they tire and drown.274
This example assumes that the plaintiff is a single female who is a 
native Alaskan. She studies and works extensively with polar bears. She 
files an action in federal district court against the three largest oil 
companies in Alaska, alleging that their carbon dioxide emissions 
account for roughly a quarter of the oil and gas sector’s carbon dioxide 
emissions and approximately twelve percent of all carbon dioxide 
emissions from human activities in the Untied States. She claims that 
the defendants have violated the Clean Air Act and that their emissions 
constitute a public nuisance. She claims the defendants’ emissions will 
injure her by their adverse effect on polar bears. 
B. Substantive Injury 
The plaintiff can claim a substantive injury by alleging that the 
defendants’ carbon emissions are threatening polar bears. Lujan 
requires her to establish the three elements of constitutional 
standing—injury-in-fact, causation, and redressability.275 She must 
first demonstrate that she will suffer a concrete injury, which she 
satisfies by proving that she has a recreational and aesthetic interest 
in working with and observing polar bears.276 Next, she must show 
that she will sustain a particularized injury, which she satisfies by 
proving that she has a distinct position from the public with respect 
to polar bears based on her experience in working with them. 
 271. Jim Carlton, Is Global Warming Killing the Polar Bears?, WALL ST. J., Dec. 14, 
2005, at B1. 
 272. Id. 
 273. Id. 
 274. Id. 
 275. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). 
 276. See discussion supra Part IV.A.1. 
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Moreover, she can allege that her studies will be impeded by the 
diminished population of polar bears.277
Because her injury is one that will occur in the future, she must 
show that her injury is certainly impending.278 The plaintiff’s first 
problem is proving that global warming will likely cause her 
threatened injury. She will fail to carry her burden here because the 
science is too uncertain with respect to the risks of global warming, 
with respect to the temperatures in the Arctic, and with respect to 
the adverse conditions for polar bears. 
The plaintiff faces an additional obstacle because she cannot show 
that global warming will cause the necessary adverse conditions 
endangering polar bears to be certainly impending.279 There are still 
20,000 to 25,000 polar bears in the world, and the most recent study 
concluded that they were not endangered.280 The plaintiff’s allegation of 
the danger to polar bears will be based on a system of climate modeling 
that is conjectural and does not provide the court with the necessary 
foundation upon which it can conclude that there is a substantial 
probability that the injury will occur in the imminent future. 
Assuming the court accepts the science attributing the polar bear 
threat to global warming and that the injury is imminent, the 
plaintiff will still fail to show causation.281 She cannot fairly trace her 
injury to the carbon emissions of the three defendants. The chain of 
causation is too attenuated by the many independent factors that 
could supervene in the ultimate harm to the polar bears.  
The plaintiff must then show that a favorable judgment from the 
court will provide them redress. The plaintiff will either ask for an 
injunction, or alternatively, civil penalties. Either of these will likely 
personally benefit her. The standard is not that the injunction or the 
penalties will result in abating her injury but that they will likely 
result in that abatement. If the companies are required to reduce 
their emissions of carbon dioxide by millions of tons, given their 
substantial contribution to carbon emissions, it is likely that their 
impact on global warming will be diminished as well as the adverse 
conditions associated with global warming. Even if it is questionable 
as to whether the reduced emissions will prevent the adverse 
 277. See discussion supra Part IV.A.2. 
 278. See discussion supra Part IV.A.3. 
 279. See discussion supra Part IV.A.4. 
 280. Carlton, supra note 271, at B1. 
 281. See discussion supra Part IV.B. 
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conditions from developing, such remedies will likely result in 
materially reducing the plaintiff’s reasonable concerns about the 
endangerment of the polar bear due to the company’s greenhouse 
gas emissions. 
Finally, the plaintiff must prove that she has prudential standing. 
If the court interprets the CAA’s zone of interests narrowly, it may 
deny her standing based on its holding that the CAA does not have 
jurisdiction over injuries caused by global warming. However, the 
court may also interpret the zone more broadly and hold that global 
warming is a danger to the air and grant standing.  
C. Procedural Injury 
Instead of filing a claim for a substantive injury or in conjunction 
with her substantive injury claim, the plaintiff may file a claim under 
NEPA. She alleges that a federal agency funded several projects in 
connection with these companies. She alleges that there was no EIS 
prepared for the project, which went forward, emitting millions of 
tons of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere. Here, she is alleging a 
procedural injury. 
She must still prove that she has constitutional standing. She is 
still required to show that she will suffer a concrete, particularized 
injury, which this analysis has already established that she can do 
with relative ease.282 She also still faces the obstacle of proving that 
global warming will likely cause the danger to the polar bears. 
Assuming the court accepts the argument, the procedural nature of 
her injury relieves her of having to show that her injury is imminent. 
Even though the polar bears may not become endangered or extinct 
for many years, she may still have standing. 
If the plaintiff is in a court that has adopted the D.C. Circuit’s 
causation standard, she will fail to prove causation, but if she is in a 
court that has adopted the Ninth Circuit’s relaxed causation 
standard, she may succeed. Under the latter standard, the court must 
find a reasonable probability, rather than a substantial probability, 
that the agency’s procedural omission will cause her injury. 
Considering the amount of credible science linking global warming 
to the warmer temperatures in the Arctic that foster the dangerous 
conditions for polar bears, a court may conclude that it is reasonable 
 282. See discussion supra Part IV.A. 
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to find that the failure to produce the EIS partly caused the plaintiff’s 
injury.283
The plaintiff must still show that a favorable judgment by the 
court will benefit her personally.284 She will satisfy this burden 
because a directive from the court telling the agency to conduct the 
appropriate environmental evaluation will benefit the plaintiff. In a 
NEPA claim, the claim is principally directed at the uninformed 
decision making. Thus, if the court orders the environmental 
evaluation to be conducted, they have provided relief in response to 
her claim.  
The plaintiff must still prove that she has prudential standing to 
bring the claim under NEPA.285 She easily meets this requirement 
because her interests in bringing the action are not monetary but are 
connected to a sincere interest in the habitat and fate of the polar bear. 
In sum, the plaintiff fails on her substantive injury claim and may 
succeed on her procedural injury claim. In first scenario, she cannot 
prove that global warming may endanger the polar bear, she cannot 
prove that it will imminently endanger the polar bear, and she 
cannot trace that alleged injury to the three companies’ carbon 
emissions. However, in the second scenario, if the court accepts that 
global warming may endanger the polar bear, she does not have to 
show the danger is imminent; and if it adopts the Ninth Circuit’s 
standard of causation, the relaxed analysis may lead it to find 
causation. In the end, her chances are much better at having 
standing on her procedural injury claim. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Thomas Gale Moore of the Hoover Institute, a conservative 
think tank at Stanford University, states, “It is simply hubris to 
believe that Homo sapiens can significantly affect temperatures, 
rainfall, and winds . . . . Global change is inevitable—warmer is 
better, richer is healthier.”286 In contrast, former Secretary of the 
 283. See discussion supra Part IV.B. 
 284. See discussion supra Part IV.C. 
 285. See discussion supra Part IV.D. 
 286. GALE E. CHRISTIANSON, GREENHOUSE: THE 200-YEAR STORY OF GLOBAL 
WARMING 253 (1999). 
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Navy James Webb believes “we can (and do)” irreversibly alter the 
environment by our actions or lack thereof.287
The search for certainty regarding the correlation of greenhouse 
gases and natural events such as hurricanes, forest fires, and floods is 
far from being resolved. And it is precisely this uncertainty—
uncertainty of the science underlying the causes of global warming 
and uncertainty regarding the climate models’ ability to predict the 
possible consequences of global warming—that will likely preclude 
petitioners from establishing standing in federal courts to seek 
redress for their alleged injuries from global warming.  
 For now, the most effective means by which plaintiffs can 
establish standing for their claims is through the “more lenient 
requirements” of standing for procedural injuries.288 Although the 
outcome in these cases is not guaranteed, plaintiffs have a 
significantly improved chance at proving standing, since the relaxed 
standards for procedural injuries allow the plaintiffs to overcome 
obstacles under the injury-in-fact and causation requirements that 
they normally confront when alleging a substantive injury.289 
Otherwise, global warming plaintiffs will likely fail to establish legal 
standing in federal court until the science can provide greater 
support for their claims. 
Blake R. Bertagna∗ 
 287. Id. 
 288. Cent. & Sw. Servs. v. EPA, 220 F.3d 698 (5th Cir. 2000). 
 289. See Shays v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 414 F.3d 76, 121 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
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